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Abstract 
The capacity of public consumption, public investment, and private investment to 
influence the economic activity has been a research topic for decades, however, there 
is no consensus about the qualitative effects of fiscal policy. The main goal of this 
dissertation is to deepen the understanding about what role public intervention, through 
PPPs, public consumption, and public investment, may play in boosting economic activity 
and to compare it with the results from innovations in private investment.  
In the first essay the macroeconomic impact of investment in PPPs, public and private 
investment in Portugal was tested using a VAR model. The results show that public and 
private investment has a positive effect in GDP while investment in PPP reduces the 
Portuguese output. Moreover, an increase in PPP investment crowds-out both private 
and public investment, while public investment presents a crowding-in effect in both 
private investment and investment in PPP; and private investment shows the same 
crowding-in effect in both investment in PPP and public investment. In the second essay, 
a VAR was applied to a panel data for 14 OECD countries to investigate the dynamic 
impact of public consumption, public investment, and private investment on the average 
output of these countries. We find that public consumption plays an active role only in 
those economies which suffered severe economic consequences in the recent crisis. On 
the contrary, private investment allows a boost in the output of all the countries under 
analysis. Finally, in the third essay, a GVAR approach was used to test for the cross-
country spillover effects of an increase in public and private investment in 16 countries. 
The findings show statistically significant cross-border effects mainly in neighboring 
countries, with the magnitude of the impacts being modest.  
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The capacity of public consumption, public investment, and private investment to 
influence economic activity has been a research topic for decades. In fact, in advanced 
economies an increase in public investment is one of the few remaining policies available 
to push economic growth, and in developing economies an increase in infrastructure 
investment will allow the much needed expansion of these countries’ productive capacity. 
A large body of empirical literature has been investigating the impact of public capital on 
the private sector and on the economy as a whole. However, there is no consensus 
about the qualitative effects of fiscal policy: the integration properties of the variables, 
the fact that production functions are estimated with differenced data, or if pooled 
regressions carried out with fixed effects can heavily influence the results, Dreger and 
Reimers (2014). As pointed out by Perotti (2007), so far the literature has not been able 
to provide robust stylized facts on the effects of fiscal policy shocks. While Keynesian 
economists predict an increase in private consumption and investment and, 
consequently, a boost in economic performance following an innovation on government 
spending, neoclassicals argue that after a positive shock to government consumption 
there will be a withdrawal of resources from the private sector that is expected to reduce 
private consumption and investment.  
From a theoretical perspective, an increase in public investment can have two opposite 
effects on private investment, e.g. Aschauer (1989b) and Mittnik and Neumann (2000). 
On the one hand, an increase in public investment needs to be financed. If public and 
private sectors compete, at least partially, for the same resources, the costs for private 
investment will rise, causing a decrease in private investment, thereby leading to a 
crowding-out effect. Conversely, in a crowding-in scenario, an increase in public 
investment can create more favorable conditions for private sector investment, especially 
through the development of facilities that can increase private capital productivity.  
2 
One way to finance public investment is through Public Private Partnerships (PPP). It is 
well known that in the 1980s and 1990s an extensive privatization program took place in 
the countries of Western Europe. These privatizations were based on the idea that the 
private sector shows higher efficiency standards in the management of companies in 
comparison to public management. However, some reservations remained about the 
private sector’s capacity to ensure the management of natural monopolies and large 
infrastructure with high sunk costs more efficiently than the public sector. In the latter 
case, PPP imposed itself, more recently, as an alternative method for financing 
investment projects traditionally funded by taxation and executed in the sphere of public 
sector.  
Against this background, the main goal of this dissertation is to deepen the 
understanding about what role public intervention, through PPPs, public consumption, 
and public investment, may play in boosting economic activity and to compare it with the 
results from innovations in private investment. In fact, in an economic environment such 
as the European Monetary Union (EMU), in which fiscal policy is the only instrument that 
governments have to offset idiosyncratic shocks, it is crucial to determine the capacity of 
public consumption and public investment to influence the economic activity of a country. 
Moreover, the recovery of the euro area over the last decade has been slow, weak, and 
uneven. After the 2007-2008 crisis some euro area countries accumulated large and 
persistent current account deficits, while other member states presented high and 
persistent surpluses. This situation leads to questioning the role of current account 
surplus countries in the European economy recovery. 
To investigate these questions we use three different econometric methodologies. First, 
we use of a VAR-model technology. This type of model makes it possible to identify a 
shock to a variable, which is an innovation that may occur independently from other 
variables. It also has the advantage of allowing the evaluation of the dynamic effects of 
all variables in the analysis and overcomes the issue of endogeneity of the regressors. 
Next, we use a panel VAR in which, as in a VAR, all variables are treated as endogenous 
and interdependent. However, the panel VAR approach allows for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity, adding a cross sectional dimension to the model. In fact, the dynamic 
interdependencies, the static interdependences, and the cross sectional 
interdependencies distinguish the panel VARs typically used in macroeconomics and 
financial analyses from the initial work of Holtz Eakin, et al. (1988), in which 
interdependencies were disregarded and sectoral homogeneity was assumed. As put by 
Canova and Ciccarelli (2013) “a panel VAR is similar to large scale VARs where dynamic 
and statistic interdependencies are allowed for. It differs because cross sectional 
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heterogeneity imposes a structure on the covariance matrix of the error terms.” In this 
case, annual data were used instead of quarterly observations, as there is no quarterly 
calendar for fiscal policy, and for that reason shocks identified with annual data may be 
closer actual shocks. The main drawback of annual data is the exclusion of within-year 
responses to shocks and also the fact that fewer observations are available. Being so, 
to increase the precision of our estimates a panel VAR data was used. Moreover, this 
study relies on macroeconomic time series data alone for shock identification, not 
imposing any restriction of the responses of the key variables to shocks to public 
consumption, public investment, and private investment.  
Last, we use a Global Vector Autoregressive (GVAR) modeling approach introduced by 
Pesaran, Schuermann, and Weiner (2004). This type of model combines individual 
country-specific models, in which domestic variables are related to country-specific 
foreign variables that match the relative importance of the rest of the world for the country 
under consideration, providing an effective way to deal with the curse of dimensionality. 
Though GVAR models are linear, they allow for a range of different interdependencies 
between variables and countries, such as theory consistent long-run relationships, short-
run spillover effects, or cross-sectional dependence in the error structure. Thus, they 
offer a fair degree of flexibility in modeling business-cycle dynamics of the world 
economy in a coherent fashion. In the cases of both the VAR and the Panel VAR 
approach, the impacts of the shocks were analyzed taking into account the results from 
the Impulse Response Functions (IRF) and Variance Decomposition. In a GVAR context 
of multi-countries and several variables, General Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs) 
are preferable to the standard IRFs proposed by Sims (1980), which assume orthogonal 
shocks. It is known that if IRFs are calculated using different orders of variables, then 
the shape of the IRFs will be different. In fact, if the model is estimated using a reduced 
number of variables, a relationship between the variables can be inferred based on 
economic theory. However, this approach is not valid for the GVAR model since it 
typically contains a large number of variables. Moreover, traditional IRFs are difficult to 
use in a GVAR since there is no realistic way to order the countries in the model. 
This dissertation comprises three essays on the relationship between public and private 
investment based on macroeconomic evidence.  
The first essay was written in co-authorship with Miguel St. Aubyn and Nuno Ribeiro and 
tests the macroeconomic impact of investment in PPPs, public and private investment in 
Portugal, through a VAR model with four variables: public investment, private investment, 
PPP investment, and GDP, for the period 1998-2013. The focus on Portugal is due to 
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two main reasons. First, Portugal is the European country that between 1990 and 2009 
spent the highest amount of money in PPP as a percentage of its GDP (10.55%), 
representing 7% of the value expended in European PPPs and being the third largest 
PPP market by value in Europe, as can be seem in Table 2.7 and Figure 2.4. Second, 
the Economic Adjustment Programme for Portugal demanded a study of the impact in 
the country’s economy of the investment made in PPPs:  
The annual review of PPPs and concessions will be accompanied by an analysis of credit 
flows channelled to PPPs through banks (loans and securities other than shares) by 
industry and an impact assessment on credit allocation and crowding out effects. This 
particular element will be done in liaison with the Bank of Portugal. , in European 
Economy, Occasional Papers, June 2011, page 70. 
Being so, an assessment of crowding-in/crowding-out effects of investment in PPPs is 
carried out.  
We also calculate the macroeconomic rates of return on investment in PPP, public 
investment, and private investment seeking to quantify the impact of each of these 
components of investment in GDP. In fact, from a macroeconomic point of view, it is 
important to have a criterion for assessing the desirability of the investment financed 
through PPPs, in contrast to public investment and private investment. To date, studies 
about PPP are very polarized between those in favor and those against PPP, have been 
mainly of a microeconomic nature, and come to very different conclusions. Pollit (2002) 
write that “in a sample of ten major PFI case evaluations undertaken, the best deal was 
probably obtained in every case, and good value for money was probably achieved in 
eight of the ten cases.”. On the contrary, Pollock, Shaoul, and Vickers (2002), Monbiot 
(2002), Bloomfield, Westerling, and Carey (1998), Greve (2003), and Walker and Walker 
(2000) studied PPPs in the United Kingdom, United States, Europe, and  Australia, 
respectively and were unanimous in concluding that PPP were not the best option if VfM 
is taken into account. Presently, the focus of investigation related to PPP has been 
changing. In fact, a new purpose is to understand the reasons why governments choose 
PPPs for investment in public infrastructures (Greve and Hodge 2008).  
The main novelty of our paper is the use of a VAR-model technology applied to 
investment in PPPs with four variables: PPP investment, public investment, private 
investment and GDP. As mentioned above, this type of model allows us to identify a 
shock to a variable, an independent innovation, with the advantages of allowing the 
evaluation of dynamic effects and of overcoming the endogeneity issue. The results 
show that public and private investment has a positive effect in GDP while investment in 
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PPP reduces the Portuguese GDP. Regarding the crowding-in/crowding-out effects, an 
increase in PPP investment crowds-out both private and public investment, while public 
investment presents a crowding-in effect in both private investment and investment in 
PPP; and private investment shows the same crowding-in effect in both investment in 
PPP and public investment.   
The second essay seeks to provide evidence on the effects of selected key 
macroeconomic variables to shocks to public consumption, public investment, and 
private investment for two distinct groups of countries that were formed according to their 
capacity to refinance their government debt or to bail out over-indebted banks on their 
own during the recent crisis of 2008-2014. Although so far the literature has been unable 
to provide robust stylized facts on the effects of fiscal policy shocks, it is a fact that VAR 
shocks to government spending seem to be associated with a rise in output. For 
instances, using a mixed structural VAR/event approach, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) 
concluded that positive government spending shocks have a positive effect on output, 
on hours, consumption, and real wages. Follow-up work, such as Galí, López-Salido and 
Vallés (2007) extended the standard new Keynesian model to allow for the presence of 
rule-of-thumb consumers, showing that consumption rises as a consequence to a shock 
in government spending. In turn, Fatas and Mihov (2002) found strong evidence in favor 
of the hypothesis that large governments reduce the volatility of both private and total 
output. However, Mountford and Uhlig (2005) and Edelberg et al. (1999) provide 
evidence that the response of private consumption is close to zero and not statistically 
significant over the entire horizon of the impulse response. Linnemann (2005) questioned 
if there is really a mismatch between business cycle theories and the evidence, showing 
that the evidence can be explained by a standard real business cycle type model. In this 
study, a VAR was applied to a panel data for 14 OECD countries to investigate the 
dynamic impact of public consumption, public investment, and private investment on the 
average output of these countries.  
Relying on macroeconomic time series data alone for shock identification, from the 
results of the Impulse Response Functions and Variance Decomposition, we find that 
countries do not react in the same way to an impulse in public consumption, public 
investment and private investment. In fact, public consumption plays an active role only 
in those economies which suffered severe economic consequences in the recent crisis. 
On the contrary, private investment allows a boost in the output of all the countries under 
analysis. This paper relies on macroeconomic time series data alone for shock 
identification, thereby not imposing any restriction of the responses of the key variables 
to shocks to public consumption, public investment, and private investment. 
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Finally, in the third essay, written in co-authorship with Miguel St. Aubyn and Paulo 
Rodrigues, a GVAR approach was used to test for the cross-country spillover effects of 
an increase in public and private investment in 16 countries. The impact of these 
innovations in a central European economy (Germany) and in a peripheral one (Portugal) 
on the majority of the European countries, USA, and Japan were examined and 
quantified by employing GIRFs. The GVAR framework has been applied to various fields, 
such as the role of credit and credit risk diversification, which were two of the subjects; 
see for instance Dees, di Mauro, Pesaran, and Smith (2006), Eickmeier and Ng (2011), 
Xu (2012), or Pesaran, Schuermann, and Treutler (2006). Monetary union membership 
counterfactual scenarios were presented by Pesaran, Smith and Smith (2007) and by 
Dubois, Hericourt, and Mignon (2009). Cashin, Mohaddes, Raissi, and Raissi (2012) 
employed a set of sign restrictions on the generalized impulse responses of a GVAR 
model to distinguish supply-driven from demand-driven oil price shocks and to study the 
time profile of their macroeconomic effects in different countries. Chudik and Fidora 
(2012) also explored the subject of supply shocks using a GVAR model.  
Inflation was another topic analyzed applying a GVAR; for details check Galesi and 
Lombardi (2009). Anderton, Galesi, Lombardi, and di Mauro (2010) calculated the impact 
of increased imports from low-cost countries on manufacturing import prices and 
estimated Phillips curves to explore whether the inflationary process in OECD countries 
changed over time. The US role as a potentially globally dominant economy was 
investigated by Dées and Saint-Guilhem (2011). Chudik and Smith (2013) extended the 
literature on the role of a globally dominant economy, once again the US, by comparing 
two models: one that treats the US as a globally dominant economy, and a standard 
version of a GVAR model that does not separate the impact of the US variables from the 
cross-section average of foreign economies, as in Dées, di Mauro, Pesaran, and Smith 
(2007). From a global imbalances perspective, Bettendorf (2012) showed that real GDP 
is a relatively unimportant variable compared to real exchange and interest rates and to 
the oil price, and also provides a counterfactual analysis of the US trade balance. 
Bussière, Chudik, and Sestieri (2012) studied the effects of demand shocks and shocks 
to relative prices on global imbalances. To the best of our knowledge the GVAR 
approach has not yet been used to test for cross-border spillover effects of an increase 
in public and private investment in the Euro area. Overall, we find that even if Germany 
increases its public investment, it will not have the desired positive impact on peripheral 
economies. The findings show statistically significant cross-border effects mainly in 
neighboring countries, with the magnitude of the impacts being modest 
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 The three essays were written in such a way that they can be read separately. For this 






















Chapter 2  
The impact of investment in Public Private 
Partnerships on Public, Private Investment, and 
GDP in Portugal 
 
Co-authors: 
 Miguel St. Aubyn, ISEG 
 Nuno Ribeiro, Financial Stability Department, Banco de Portugal 
 
2.1. Introduction 
In the 1980s and 1990s an extensive privatization program took place in the countries of 
Western Europe. These privatizations were motivated by the idea that the private sector 
shows higher efficiency standards in the management of companies in comparison to 
public management. However, there remained some reservations about the private 
sector’s capacity to ensure the management of natural monopolies and large 
infrastructure with high sunk costs more efficiently than the public sector. 
In the latter case, Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) became popular, more recently, as 
alternatives to the traditional way of financing investment projects through taxation and 
execution in the public sector sphere.  
This paper studies the impact of investment in Public Private Partnerships on public and 
private investment and GDP in Portugal. The focus on Portugal is due to two main 
reasons:  Portugal is the European country that between 1990 and 2009, spent the 
greatest amount of money in PPP as a percentage of its GDP (10.55%), representing 
7% of the value expended in European PPPs and being the third largest PPP market by 
value in Europe (see Table 2.7. and Figure 2.4. in the Appendix); and the memorandum 
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of understanding for Portugal demanded a study of the impact in the country’s economy 
of the investment made in PPPs.  
Our assessment of crowding-in/crowding-out effects of investment in PPPs is therefore 
undertaken. We calculate macroeconomic rates of return on investment in PPP, public 
investment, and private investment, seeking to quantify the impact of each of these 
components of investment in GDP.  
Macroeconomic theory suggests that an increase in investment in PPPs in public 
investment can have two opposite effects on private investment (Aschauer 1989b, and 
Mittnik and Neumann 2000). On the one hand, an increase in public investment in PPPs 
is partly funded in the capital markets, which would lead to a reduction in the funds 
available to private investors and to an increase in interest rates charged by lenders. 
This would lead to a decrease in the rate of return on private investment, thus causing 
crowding-out of this. Conversely, an increase in public investment in PPPs can create 
more favorable conditions for investment by the private sector, especially through the 
development of road infrastructure, railway, airports, among others. In this case, there is 
crowding-in in private investment.  
From a macroeconomic point of view, it is important to have a criterion for assessing the 
desirability of the investment financed through PPPs, in contrast to public investment 
and private investment. 
The main novelty of this paper is the use of a VAR-model technology applied to 
investment in PPPs with four variables: PPP investment, public investment, private 
investment, and GDP. This type of model allows us to identify a shock to a variable, 
which is an independent innovation that may occur in other variables. It also has the 
advantage of allowing the evaluation of the dynamic effects of all variables in the analysis 
and overcoming the issue of endogeneity of the regressors. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 briefly reviews general 
literature about PPP and studies that have applied a VAR approach to study the impact 
of public and private investment on the economy. Section 2.3 describes the econometric 
methodology underlying our empirical application, namely, VAR specifications, 
macroeconomic rates of return, and the computation of crowding-in and crowding-out 
effects. Section 2.4 discusses the empirical results of this study. Section 2.5 summarizes 
the main findings, and, finally, the Appendix provides information on the list of 




2.2. Literature Review 
Studies about PPP are very polarized between those in favor and those against PPP.  
The term PPP has been used more frequently in the literature since the 1990s.  
The public-private partnerships (PPP) phenomenon has been with us for a long time. The 
phrase first became used by a specialist audience in the 1970s, and books were being 
written about such partnerships even in the 1980s (e.g. Rose, 1986), although it was the 
1990s before it was widely recognized, when the Private Finance Initiative was launched 
by the John Major administration in the UK, and the acronyms ‘PPP’ became common 
currency. However, the actual phenomenon goes much further back into history. (Bovaird 
2010).  
It is used to refer to different types of contracts between the public and private sector. 
(Argy 1999).  
However there is some consensus concerning the key elements of a PPP. As can be 
found in Commission of the European Communities (2004), the main elements that 
characterize a PPP are: 
(…) the relatively long duration of the relationship, involving cooperation between the 
public partner and the private partner (…); (…)the method of funding the Project, in part 
from the private sector, sometimes by means of complex arrangements between the 
various players(…); (…)the distribution of risks between the public partner and private 
partner(…). 
Other definitions can be found in Van Ham and Koppenjan (2001) and Lossa and 
Martimort (2008). 
Broadbent and Laughlin (1999) were pioneers in this field of investigation, raising five 
main questions for the study of PPPs in England, namely:  
Is PFI a form of privatisation of the public sector? What is the nature of PFI and who is regulating 
its application? How are definitions of PFI in terms of value for money and risk transfer derived 
and operationalised? How are PFI decisions made in different areas of the public sector and what 
are the effects of these decisions? What is the merit and worth of PFI?The question of value 
for money (VfM) has been largely discussed concerning PPPs. Hodge and Greve (2008) 
argue that:  
Value for Money is a purposely vague concept and one designed to reorient the language 
of debate away from traditional concerns such as choosing the “cheapest” competitive 
construction bid which meets the public interest, towards discussion of whole-of-life costs, 
risk transfers and risk-adjusted discounted rates for specific large projects. 
The studies carried out to evaluate PPPs performance have been until now mainly of a 
microeconomic nature and come to very different conclusions. Pollit (2002) says that “in 
a sample of ten major PFI case evaluations undertaken, the best deal was probably 
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obtained in every case, and good value for money was probably achieved in eight of the 
ten cases.” Pollock, Shaoul, and Vickers (2002), Monbiot (2002), Bloomfield, Westerling, 
and Carey (1998), Greve (2003), and Walker and Walker (2000) studied PPPs in the 
United Kingdom, United States, Europe, and  Australia, respectively and were 
unanimous in concluding that PPP where not the best option if VfM is taken into account. 
Also concerning econometric studies related to PPPs, Hammami, Ruhashyankiko, and 
Yehoue (2006) carried out a first attempt “to analyze the determinants of PPPs in 
infrastructure projects using the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) 
database on projects for developing countries during 1990-2003”. 
Presently, the focus of investigation related to PPP has been changing. In fact, a new 
purpose is to understand the reasons why governments choose PPPs to investment in 
public infrastructures. “In other words, our renewed agenda items should tackle why 
governments choose to introduce PPP despite the fact that projects can be financed 
through traditional methods” Greve and Hodge (2008). In 1996 Terry said that  “Private 
financing promised a way to provide infrastructure without increasing the public sector 
borrowing ratio.”  Hodge (2002) calls the attention to the fact that the duration of a PPP 
can cover more than one parliamentary term and Flinders (2005) argues that 
”Governments continue to display such an apparently blind commitment to PPPs.”. 
More recently Greve and Hodge (2008) up dated the study carried by Broadbent and 
Laughlin (1999). In their opinion the most relevant questions related to PPPs are:  
1. What is the merit/worth of PPPs?  
2. In what circumstances do PPPs provide an effective and efficient tool for 
governments in terms of simply VfM [value for money] and innovation?  
3. In what circumstances do PPPs provide governments with a successful 
governance tool to overcome traditional governance failures?  
4. How can PPPs be best regulated in the public interest in the future?  
5. What role to date have Auditors General undertaken in PPP evaluation, and how 
might we meta-summarize their assessment to date?  
6. Why and how are PPPs promoted in some jurisdictions and not in others?  
7. What is the nature and consequence of a global “PPP industry”?  
8. What is the place of PPPs in development activities?  




This paper analyzes the investment in PPP in a macroeconomic perspective since it 
studies the aggregated effects of investment in PPP in other macroeconomic 
aggregates, such as, public investment, private investment, and GDP. An assessment 
of crowding-in/crowding-out effects of investment in PPPs is carried out and 
macroeconomic rates of return on investment in PPP, public investment, and private 
investment were calculated and aimed at quantifying the impact of each of these 
components of investment in GDP.  
In fact, since Aschauer’s work (1989a, 1989b) there has been interest in analyzing the 
effects of public investment on aggregate economic activity and also to investigate 
whether public investment crowds-in/crowds-out private investment. 
Voss (2002) and Mittnik and Neaumann (2001) estimated the effects of public investment 
on GDP and the crowding-in/crowding-out effects using a VAR approach.  Voss (2002) 
estimated a VAR model with GDP, public investment, private investment, the real interest 
rate, and deflators of private and public investment for the US and Canada for the period 
of 1947-1997 and concluded that public investment crowds-out private investment. 
Mittnik and Neaumann (2001) used a VAR model with GDP, private investment, public 
investment, and public consumption for six industrialized economies. They concluded 
that public investment tends to exert positive effects on GDP, and that there is no 
evidence of crowding-out effects. 
Pereira and Andraz (2005) used data for Portugal between 1976 and 1998 using a VAR-
model considering private-sector output, employment, investment, and public 
investment. Empirical results at the aggregate level indicate that public investment 
positively affects private investment, employment, and output.  
More recently, Afonso and St. Aubyn (2009), using annual data from 14 European Union 
countries, Canada, Japan, and the United States evaluated the macroeconomic effects 
of public and private investment with a VAR analysis. The results point to the existence 
of positive effects of public investment and private investment on output. On the other 
hand, the crowding-in effect of public investment on private investment varies across 
countries, while the crowding-in effects of private investment on public investment are 






2.3. Econometric Methodology 
2.3.1 VAR specification 
A four variable VAR model was estimated. The variables included in the VAR are the 
logarithmic growth rates of real Public Private Partnerships investment (IPPP), real public 
investment (IPub), real private investment (IPriv), and real output (Y).The list of 
concessions used to calculate the PPP investment can be seen in Table 2.8 of the 
Appendix. Public investment was calculated by the difference between the Gross Fixed 
Capital Formation series (GFCF) from Public Administration and the investment from 
reclassified PPP as belonging to Public Administration. Regarding private investment, it 
results from the difference between the GFCF made by the private sector and the 
investment from the non-reclassified PPP. 
The VAR model can be presented as: 
                       𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = 𝑐𝑐 + ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖
𝑝𝑝
𝑖𝑖=1 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡                                                  (1) 
 
where 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 denotes the (4x1) vector of four endogenous variables given by 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 =
[∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡    ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡    ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡   ∆𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑙𝑌𝑌𝑡𝑡  ], c is a (4x1) vector of intercept terms,  A 
is the matrix of autoregressive coefficients of order (4x4), and 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 =
�𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡
𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝   𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡
𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼  𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡
𝐼𝐼𝑝𝑝𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼     𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡𝑌𝑌� is a vector of random disturbances that contains the reduced 
form OLS residuals.  
It is possible to identify orthogonal shocks, 𝜂𝜂, for each variable in (1), by  imposing a set 
of restrictions, and to compute these orthogonal innovations via the random 
disturbances: 
𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡 = 𝐵𝐵𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡                                                              (2) 
 
The estimation of (1) allows the determination of 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼(𝜀𝜀). Therefore, with orthogonal 
restrictions and by means of an adequate normalization, we have 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼(𝜂𝜂) = 𝐼𝐼, where 𝐼𝐼 =
(4𝑋𝑋4) identity matrix , and we can write: 
        𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼(𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡) = 𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼(𝐵𝐵𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡) = 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼(𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡)𝐵𝐵′                                     (3) 
 
                                                             𝐼𝐼 = 𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼(𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡)𝐵𝐵′                                                 (4) 
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B has 16 parameters that need to be identified, since B is a square (𝑛𝑛𝑋𝑋𝑛𝑛) matrix, which 
in this case has dimension four. From (4) only 12 parameters can be determined, by 
imposing orthogonality, essentially from the four variances and from the eight 
covariances. Four more restrictions are needed for the complete identification of the 
model. The use of a Choleski decomposition of the matrix of covariances of the residuals, 
which requires all elements above the principal diagonal to be zero, provides the 
necessary additional six restrictions, and the system is then exactly identified. 
A lower triangular structure to 𝐵𝐵−1can be imposed, 
                                           𝐵𝐵−1 = 𝐷𝐷 = �
𝑑𝑑11 0 0 0
𝑑𝑑21 𝑑𝑑22 0 0
𝑑𝑑31 𝑑𝑑32 𝑑𝑑33 0
𝑑𝑑41 𝑑𝑑42 𝑑𝑑43 𝑑𝑑44
�                                       (5) 
 
which makes it possible to write the residuals 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 as a function of the orthogonal shocks 
in each of the variables: 
𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 = 𝐷𝐷𝜂𝜂𝑡𝑡 
             
The variables in the VAR were ordered from what is theoretically considered the most 
exogenous variable to the least exogenous one, with PPP investment ordered first, 
followed by public investment, private investment, and output. Being so, a shock in PPP 
investment may have an instantaneous effect on all of the other variables. However, PPP 
investment does not respond contemporaneously to structural disturbances in the other 
variables. A shock in public investment, the second variable, does not have an 
instantaneous impact on PPP investment, only on private investment and output. In fact, 
this ordering implies that private investment responds to PPP and public investment in a 
contemporaneous way, but not to shocks to the other variables. Indeed, one can recall 
that governments typically announce their spending and investment plans in advance. 







2.3.2 Macroeconomic rates of return  
Six different rates of return were computed based on the results from impulse response 
functions:  
• the partial rate of return of investment in PPP;  
• the partial rate of return of public investment; 
• the partial rate of return of private investment; 
• the rate of return of total investment deriving from an impulse to PPP investment; 
• the rate of return of total investment deriving from an impulse to public 
investment; 
• the rate of return of total investment deriving from an impulse to private 
investment; 
The partial rate of return of investment in PPP is computed as in Pereira (2000). 
Following an orthogonal impulse to investment in PPP the long-run accumulated 
elasticity of Y with respect to investment in PPP, IPPP, was computed deriving from the 






This long-run elasticity is the ratio between the accumulated change in the growth rate 
of output and the accumulated change in the growth rate of PPP investment. 








Being so, the partial rate of return of investment in PPP is obtained by solving: 





Note that it is not possible to decompose the variation of the product that is due 
separately to a change in investment in PPP and the consequent change in public 
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investment and/or private investment. Thus, the isolated reading of the partial rate of 
return can bias the analysis of the total impact in the product of a variation of investment 
in PPP. We used 20 years to compute both rates of return, as we assumed an average 
life of 20 years for a capital good. 
The partial rates of return of public and private investment were computed using the 
same technology mentioned above. 
Following Pina and St. Aubyn (2006) the rate of return of total investment deriving from 
an impulse to PPP investment was obtained as a solution for: 
(1 + 𝐼𝐼)20 =
∆𝑌𝑌

















That is, following a shock in investment in PPP, both the direct impact of this shock and 
the indirect impact through changes taking place in public and private investment that 
result from this shock in PPP investment, are taken into account. 
The rate of return of total investment deriving from an impulse to public and private and 
investment was computed using the same technology mentioned above. 
 
2.3.3 Crowding-in and crowding-out effects 
The marginal effects of PPP investment on public investment and private investment 





















In this way it is possible to check for the existence of crowding-in or crowding-out effects 
of PPP investment on public and private investment. These same effects were 
computed, following the same technology, for changes on public and private investment. 
 
2.4. Empirical Results 
2.4.1 Data 
Annual data from 1998 to 2013 were used for the Portuguese economy. All variables are 
presented at constant prices. GDP was transformed into real values using the price 
deflator of GDP. The price deflator of the general government gross fixed capital 
formation was used to transform both the investment in PPP and the public investment 
into real values, and the price deflator of the gross fixed capital formation of the private 
sector to transform private investment. The data sources for the investment in PPP are 
UTAP, Brisa, and INE.  
 
2.4.2 VAR estimation   
All variables used in the VAR are in logarithmic growth rates and in first differences of 
the original values. The unit root analysis showed that these first differenced variables 
are stationary, I(0) time series. Table 2.1 summarizes the results for the unit root test 
statistics. 
 
Table 2.1. Unit root tests, variables in first differences: Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
 Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
  t-Statistic Critical value 
dlog (Y) -5.5407 -2.7406 
dlog(IPPP) -2.9548 -2.7406 
dlog(Ipub) -2.8271 -2.7406 
dlog(Ipriv) -4.8176 -2.7406 
                                    Note: critical values are for 1% level. No tendency or interception was adopted. 
 
The Akaike and the Schwartz information criteria were used to select the VAR order used 
in the estimation. Taking into account the length of the data used in the VAR and those 
tests, a parsimonious model with only one lag was chosen in order to avoid the use of 
too many degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis of normality of the VAR residuals was 
not rejected. The diagnostic tests for normality are presented in Table 2.2. For a p-value 
18 
 
of 5% the null hypothesis of no serial correlation of the residuals cannot be rejected as 















2.4.3 Rates of return 
The information on accumulated responses of all VAR variables to a shock in investment 
in PPP and in public and private investment is presented in Table 2.3. A 95 percent 
confidence band around estimates is also included and the figures in bold represent the 
cases in which those confidence bands include positive or negative values only. The 
conclusion is that impulses in investment in PPP have no statistically significant effects 
on the other variables at 95 percent level. On the other hand, impulses to private and 
public investment have a positive and significant impact on output. 
 
 
Table 2.2 Residual normality tests 
          
     
Component Skewness Chi-sq df Prob. 
          
1  1.222453  3.486915 1  0.0619 
2 -0.072623  0.012306 1  0.9117 
3  1.074501  2.693956 1  0.1007 
4 -0.028190  0.001854 1  0.9657 
          
Joint   6.195031 4  0.1850 
          
     
Component Kurtosis Chi-sq df Prob. 
          
1  4.036431  0.626610 1  0.4286 
2  2.229281  0.346505 1  0.5561 
3  4.694197  1.674344 1  0.1957 
4  2.001411  0.581688 1  0.4457 
          
Joint   3.229147 4  0.5202 
          
     
Component Jarque-Bera Df Prob.  
          
1  4.113525 2  0.1279  
2  0.358811 2  0.8358  
3  4.368300 2  0.1126  
4  0.583542 2  0.7469  
          
Joint  9.424178 8  0.3078  
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Table 2.3. Accumulated responses to shocks in PPP and public and private investment 
Accumulated 
responses of Shock to investment in PPP Shock to Public Investment Shock to Private Investment 
-2 S.E. CENTRAL +2 S.E -2 S.E. CENTRAL +2 S.E -2 S.E. CENTRAL +2 S.E 
IPPP 0.0675 0.3804 0.6933 -0.0318 0.2513 0.5344 -0.1333 0.2914 0.7161 
IPub -0.1158 -0.0291 0.0576 0.0627 0.1403 0.2179 -0.0631 0.0507 0.1645 
IPriv -0.065 -0.0274 0.0102 -0.0116 0.0233 0.0582 0.0499 0.0982 0.1465 
Y -0.0158 0.001 0.0178 0.0092 0.0245 0.0398 0.0182 0.0393 0.0604 
 
The results for the output elasticity and the partial and total rates of returns of an impulse 
in investment in PPP, public investment, and private investment, for the period in which 
data are available, are presented in Tables 2.9, 2.10, and 2.11, respectively, in the 
Appendix. These three types of investment present a positive output elasticity, with the 
output elasticity of private investment (0.3998) being higher than the output elasticity of 
public investment (0.1743) and investment in PPP (0.0026).  
Both public and private investments present a positive partial and total rate of return, with 
the total rate of return of public investment (0.0491) greater than the total rate of return 
of private investment (0.0332). In the case of the investment in PPP, this rate of return 
cannot be calculated since its partial rate of return is negative.  
 
2.4.4 Crowding-in and crowding-out effects 
The results for the crowding-in and crowding-out effects for the investment in PPP, public 
investment, and private investment are presented in Tables 2.4, 2.5, and 2.6 
respectively.  εIPriv 
Table 2.4. Crowding-in or crowding-out effects resulting from an impulse in the investment in 
PPP 
εIPriv -0.0365 
 εIPub -0.0344 




Crowding-in or crowding-out effects resulting from an 






Investment in PPP presents a crowding-out effect in both public and private investment, 
with the magnitude of the crowding-out effect on private investment (-2.1166) greater 
than in public investment (-0.4005). On the other hand, public investment crowds-in in 
both private investment and investment in PPP, showing a greater impact in private 
investment (0.9317) than in investment in PPP (0.3425). Finally, private investment also 
shows a crowding-in effect in both investment in PPP and public investment, with the 
impact in the investment in PPP (0.1011) being slightly greater than in public investment 
(0.0918).  
 
Table 2.5. Crowding-in or crowding-out effects resulting from an impulse in public investment 
 𝜀𝜀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼 1.0507 
 𝜀𝜀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 0.1743 




Crowding-in or crowding-out effects resulting 






















Crowding-in or crowding-out effects resulting 






Investment in PPP leads to a crowding-out effect in both private and public investment 
and has a negative impact on GDP. In fact, the partial rate of return of an investment in 
PPP is negative and the total rate of return associated with investment in PPP cannot be 
calculated since the accumulated gross growth rate in 20 years is negative. 
Public investment presents a crowding-in effect in private investment and in investment 
in PPP. In fact, in the presence of a positive shock in public investment, the impulse 
response functions show a positive initial impact in both investment in PPP and GDP. 
The output elasticity of public investment is positive and statistically significant. The 
partial rate of return of public investment is greater than its total rate of return due to the 
fact that in the presence of a shock in public investment the response from the private 
investment and investment in PPP leads to an increase in output.  
Finally, private investment crowds-in in both investment in PPP and in public investment. 
The output elasticity of private investment is positive and statistically significant. The 
partial rate of return of private investment is higher than its total rate of return taking into 
account that the response of both public investment and investment in PPP to a shock 
in public investment is positive.  
The results that point to the existence of crowding-out in private and public investment 
as a consequence of investment in PPP, together with a negative partial rate of return of 
PPPs, are evidence that investment in PPP in Portugal, which involved almost 
exclusively the construction and operation of road infrastructures, is not the most efficient 
method of financing this kind of investment and/or have facilitated the expansion of road 
infrastructures beyond the social optimum. In fact, the investment through PPPs does 
not appear to be the kind of investment leading to the higher productivity that the 
Portuguese economy needs for a sustained increase in its export capacity and to allow 
for the correction of the accumulated external imbalances. Empirical results also support 
the belief that this kind of investment undermined the capacity of private agents and the 
public sector to carry out their investment activities. 
These conclusions are obviously conditioned by the information used, to the concessions 
analyzed, and to the size of the sample used, the time period, and frequency. In fact, to 
estimate this VAR model, only 16 annual observations (1998-2013) are available. Using 
one constant, four variables, and one lag we estimate 5 parameters with only 14 
observations. This equates to fewer than 3 observations per parameter. This number of 
observations is relatively small for drawing conclusions from the model with a high 
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degree of robustness. This small number of observations is also reflected in the impulse 
response functions shown in Figures 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3. In many cases the impulse 
response functions are statistically not different from zero. 
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With respect to the VAR model, other specifications were tested that included variables 
such as the total amount of taxes at constant prices, the long-term interest rate, and the 
level of employment, revealing no impact on the final results.  
 
2.6. Appendix 
Table 2.7. Total amount of investment in PPP between 1990-2009 as a percentage of the 2009 
















































Road sector  
Concessão Lusoponte  
Concessão Norte  
Concessão Oeste  
Concessão Brisa  
Concessão Litoral Centro  
Concessão Beira Interior  
Concessão Costa de Prata  
Concessão Algarve  
Concessão Interior Norte  
Concessão Beiras Litoral e Alta  
Concessão Norte Litoral  
Concessão Grande Porto  
Concessão Douro Litoral  
Concessão Grande Lisboa  
Concessão Túnel do Marão 
Subconcessão Transmontana  
Subconcessão Douro Interior  
Subconcessão Baixo Alentejo  
Subconcessão Baixo Tejo  
Subconcessão Litoral Oeste  
Subconcessão Algarve Litoral  
Subconcessão Pinhal Interior  
Healthcare sector  
H. Braga - Gestão do Estabelecimento  
H. Braga - Gestão do Edifício  
H. Cascais - Gestão do  Estabelecimento  
H. Cascais - Gestão do Edifício  
H. Loures - Gestão do Estabelecimento  
H. Loures - Gestão do Edifício  
H. V Franca - Gestão do Estabelecimento  
H. V Franca - Gestão do Edifício  
Rail sector  




























Table 2.10. Partial and total rates of returns deriving from an impulse in public investment 
Impulse response functions 
acumulated results   
ΔlogY 0.0245 
Δlog Ipriv 0.0233 
Δlog Pub 0.1403 
Δlog IPPP 0.2513 
 𝜀𝜀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 1.0507 
 𝜀𝜀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 0.1743 








∆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + ∆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + ∆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
 2.6077 
Rate of return  
Parcial rate of return 0.0926 
Total rate of return 0.0491 
 
Impulse response functions 
acumulated results   
ΔlogY 0.0010 
Δlog Ipriv -0.0274 
ΔlogIPub -0.0291 
Δlog IPPP 0.3804 
 𝜀𝜀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼 -0.0365 
 𝜀𝜀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 -0.0344 








∆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + ∆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + ∆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
 -0.2325 
Rate of return  
Parcial rate of return -0.0207 
Total rate of return - 
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Table 2.11. Partial and total rates of returns deriving from an impulse in private investment 
Impulse response functions 
acumulated results   
ΔlogY 0.0393 
Δlog Ipriv 0.0982 
Δlog Ipub 0.0506 
Δlog IPPP 0.2915 
 𝜀𝜀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼 0.3998 
 𝜀𝜀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 0.7755 








∆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + ∆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 + ∆𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
 1,9207 
Rate of return  
Parcial rate of return 0.0404 




Figure 2.4. Countries’ percentage shares of value of projects of European PPPs, 1990-2009 
aggregate 
 










K ES PT EL FR DE IT HU N















The Dynamic Impact of Government Spending 
and Public Private Investment on Output: Panel 
VAR Evidence from 14 OECD Countries  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The capacity of public consumption and public investment to influence the economic 
activity of a country is crucial in an economic environment such as the European 
Monetary Union (EMU), in which fiscal policy is the only instrument that governments 
have to offset idiosyncratic shocks.  However, there is no consensus about the qualitative 
effects of fiscal policy. While Keynesian economists predict an increase in private 
consumption and investment and, consequently, a boost in the economic performance 
following an innovation on government spending, the neoclassical models suggest that 
after a positive shock to government consumption there will be a withdrawal of resources 
from private sector that is expected to reduce private consumption and investment.     
A large body of empirical literature has been investigating the impact of public capital on 
the private sector and on the economy as a whole. However, as pointed out by Perotti 
(2007), so far the literature has not been able to provide robust stylized facts on the 
effects of fiscal policy shocks.  
Vector autoregression (VAR) shocks to government spending seem to be associated 
with a rise in output. For instance, using a mixed structural VAR/event approach, 
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Blanchard and Perotti (2002) concluded that positive government spending shocks have 
a positive effect on output, on hours, consumption and real wages. Follow-up work, such 
as Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés (2007) extended the standard new Keynesian model 
to allow for the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers, showing that consumption rises 
as a consequence to a shock in government spending. Fatas and Mihov (2002) found 
strong evidence in favor of the hypothesis that large governments reduce the volatility of 
both private and total output.  However, Mountford and Uhlig (2005) and Edelberg et al. 
(1999) provided evidence that the response of private consumption is close to zero and 
not statistically significant over the entire horizon of the impulse response.  Linnemann 
(2005) questioned if there is really a mismatch between business cycle theories and the 
evidence, showing that the evidence can be explained by a standard real business cycle 
type model. In fact, with a non-additively separable utility function and a small 
intertemporal consumption elasticity, higher fiscal spending can raise consumption and 
lower investment, as is seen in the data. Caldara and Kamps (2008) also defend that 
controlling for differences in specification of the reduced-form model, all identification 
approaches used in the literature yield qualitatively and quantitatively very similar results 
as regards government spending shocks. 
Against this background this chapter aims to provide evidence on the effects on a set of 
key macroeconomic variables to shocks to public consumption, public investment, and 
private investment for two distinct groups of countries that were formed according to their 
capacity to refinance their government debt or to bail out over-indebted banks on their 
own during the recent crisis of 2008-2014.   
To do so, a panel VAR framework was used. This chapter relies on macroeconomic time 
series data alone for shock identification, thereby not imposing any restriction of the 
responses of the key variables to shocks to public consumption, public investment, and 
private investment. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and 
econometric methodology underlying our empirical application. Section 3 discusses the 







3.2. Econometric methodology 
As in a VAR model, in a panel VAR all variables are treated as endogenous and 
interdependent. However, the panel VAR approach also allows for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity, adding a cross-sectional dimension to the model. The dynamic 
interdependencies, the static interdependences, and the cross-sectional 
interdependencies distinguish the panel VARs typically used in macroeconomics and 
financial analyses from the initial work from Holtz Eakin, et. al (1988), in which 
interdependencies were disregarded and sectoral homogeneity was assumed. As put by 
Canova and Ciccarelli (2013) “a panel VAR is similar to large scale VARs where dynamic 
and statistic interdependencies are allowed for. It differs because cross sectional 
heterogeneity imposes a structure on the covariance matrix of the error terms.”  
As pointed out by Baltagi (2005), the use of panel data allows the control of the individual 
heterogeneity of each section, the use of more information and more variability, less 
collinearity between the variables, higher degrees of freedom and more efficiency. The 
use of panel data also allows the study of dynamics of adjustment to changes that arise 
unexpectedly, and are better at identifying and quantifying effects that are not detected 
in the data. 
Panel VARs have been used to address many macroeconomic issues. The panel VAR 
technology has been applied in the fields of business cycle literature as in Canova et al. 
(2007) and in Canova and Ciccarelli (2012), and to construct coincident or leading 
indicators of economic activity in Cannova and Ciccarelli (2009). De Grave and Karas 
(2012) and Canova (2004) used this technique to examine the extent of dynamic 
heterogeneity and of convergence clubs. The transmission of idiosyncratic shocks can 
also be studied using panel VARs. For example, Caivano, M. (2006) analyzed how 
disturbances in the Euro area are transmitted to the U.S. and vice versa. Ciccarelli et al. 
(2012a) investigated heterogeneity and spillovers in macro-financial linkages across 
developed economies, with emphasis on the most recent recession.  Beetsma and 
Giuliadori (2011) reviewed the theoretical consequences of government purchases 
shocks for both closed and open economies, showing that among other things, an 
increase in government purchases raises output, consumption, and investment and 
reduces the trade balance. Lane and Benetrix (2011) also examined the cross-country 
dispersion in fiscal outcomes during 2007-2009. Finally, the dynamic relationship 
between firms’ financial conditions and investment was studied by Love and Zicchino 
(2006), who concluded that the impact of financial factors on investment, which indicates 
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the severity of financing constraints, is significantly greater in countries with less 
developed financial systems. 
Another application of panel VARs is the construction of average effects and 
characterizing unit specific differences in relation to the average. In this area, Canova 
and Pappa (2014) studied the effect of regional expenditure and revenue shocks on price 
differentials for 47 US. states and 9 EU countries and concluded that on average, 
expansionary fiscal disturbances produce positive price differential responses, while 
distortionary balance budget shocks produce negative ones. Rebucci (2010) examined 
the role of external and policy factors for growth variability and concluded that temporary 
external shocks are an important determinant of medium to long-run growth variability 
and that high inflation countries are more vulnerable to external shocks than others. 
Ciccarelli et al. (2012) investigated how financial fragility affected the transmission 
mechanism of the single Euro area monetary policy during the crisis until the end of 
2011, concluding that the monetary transmission mechanism was time-varying and 
influenced by the financial fragility of the sovereigns, banks, firms, and households.  
 
3.2.1 Data 
We used a panel data for 14 European countries to study the dynamic relationship 
between public consumption and investment, private investment, and output level.  
Annual data over the period 1995-2016 were used for 14 countries: Austria (AT), Belgium 
(BE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Ireland 
(IE), Italy (IT), Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE) and the United 
Kingdom (UK). Annual data were used instead of quarterly observations as there is no 
quarterly calendar for fiscal policy, and for that reason shocks identified with annual data 
may be closer to the actual shocks. See Beetsma, Giuliodori, and Klaassen (2008) and 
Ramey (2006). The main drawback of annual data is the exclusion of within-year 
responses to shocks and also the fact that fewer observations are available. Being so, 
to increase the precision of our estimates panel VAR data were used.  
All variables are presented at constant prices and in logarithmic growth rates of the 
original values. GDP was transformed into real values using the GDP price deflator. The 
price deflator for gross fixed capital formation was used to transform both private 
investment and public investment from current to constant prices. The data for public 




 3.2.2 Structure of the model  
As mentioned above, our main goal is to compare the response of GDP to a shock in 
public consumption, public investment, and private investment for the group of 14 
European countries under analysis and also to check for crowding-out effects or 
crowding-in effects. To investigate if there are significant differences between these 
countries, “all countries”, we split them into two groups: a first group of five Southern 
European countries which, during the European debt crisis, were unable to refinance 
their government debt or to bail out over-indebted banks on their own, and a second 
group of the nine remaining countries, which did not suffer from such severe economic 
difficulties. The first group, hereinafter the “peripheral countries”, comprises Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; the second group, hereinafter “core countries” 
comprises Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden 
and the United Kingdom.  
Panel VARs and VAR models have the same structure as all variables are assumed to 
be endogenous and interdependent but in Panel VARs a cross sectional dimension is 
added. The representation of a panel VAR is the following: 
 
                                                   𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴0𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) + 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖(𝑙𝑙)𝑌𝑌1𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡                                                           (1) 
 
where 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 is a 𝐺𝐺 𝑋𝑋 1 vector of random disturbances and 𝐴𝐴0𝑖𝑖 and 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 may depend on the 
unit. 
The representation of a panel VARX is: 
                                    𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴0𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡) + 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖(𝑙𝑙)𝑌𝑌1𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖(𝑙𝑙)𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 + 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡                                    (2) 
 
where 𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡 = [𝐼𝐼1𝑡𝑡,𝐼𝐼2𝑡𝑡, … ,𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡]′~𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑑𝑑(0,∑) , 𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖,𝑗𝑗 are 𝐺𝐺x𝑀𝑀 matrices for each 𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , 𝑞𝑞 and 
𝑊𝑊𝑡𝑡 is a 𝑀𝑀x1 vector of predetermined or exogenous variables, common to all units 𝐼𝐼. 
As pointed out by Canova and Ciccarelli (2013), Panel VARs present three characteristic 
features: “dynamic interdependences” that is, lags of all endogenous variables of all units 
enter the model for unit 𝐼𝐼; “static interdependences” since 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 are generally correlated 
across 𝐼𝐼, and “cross sectional heterogeneity”, that is, the intercept, the slope and the 
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variance of the shocks 𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 may be unit specific. However these three characteristic 
features do not have to be included in all applications. 
 
We specified the VAR model as follows: 
                                              𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐴𝐴0 + 𝐴𝐴1𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 + 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡                                             (3) 
 
where 𝐼𝐼 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁 indicates countries, 𝑡𝑡 = 1, …𝑇𝑇 indicates time, 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡  is a four-variable 
vector {𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 ,𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼𝑁𝑁𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡,𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡}. PUBCONSUMP is the logarithmic 
growth rates of public consumption, PUBINV is the logarithmic growth rates of public 
investment, PRIVINV is the logarithmic growth rates of private investment, and GDP is 
the logarithmic growth rates of real gross domestic product. 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 is a vector of random 
disturbances.  
To apply the VAR approach to panel data, the underlying structure has to be the same 
for each cross-sectional unit. This constraint is very unlikely to be verified. One way to 
overcome this restriction on parameters is to introduce fixed effects in the model, 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖, i.e., 
allowing for “individual heterogeneity” in the levels of the variables. 
Using the reduced form VAR is useful as it allows for the implementation of dynamic 
simulations, once the unknown parameters are estimated. These simulations typically 
involve impulse response analysis and variance decompositions, making it possible to 
understand the impact of a shock in any particular variable on the other variables in the 
system, while holding everything else equal. However, to isolate shocks in one specific 
variable in the system the residuals must be decomposed in such a way that they 
become orthogonal. To do so the variables in the VAR were ordered from what is 
theoretically considered the most exogenous variable to the least exogenous one, with 
public consumption ordered first, followed by public investment, private investment, and 
output. This identification assumption follows earlier research in ordering public 
consumption before output, see Bénétrix and Lane (2013) and Beetsma, Giuliodori, and 
Klaassen (2005). A shock in public consumption may have an instantaneous effect on 
all of the other variables. However, public consumption does not respond 
contemporaneously to structural disturbances in the other variables. A shock in public 
investment, the second variable, does not have an instantaneous impact on public 
consumption, only on private investment and output. Indeed, one can recall that 
34 
 
governments typically announce their spending and investment plans in advance. As a 
result, economic agents can incorporate this information in their decisions.  
 
3.2.3 Unit Root Tests  
The Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003) test, which is based on the Dickey-Fuller procedure, 
was used to investigate the presence of unit roots in panels. This test combines 
information from the time series dimension with information from the cross-section 
dimension, such that fewer time observations are required in order for the test to have 
power. Table 3.1 reports the results for the Im, Pesaran, and Shin test on levels with 
trend and without trend, for all variables, for the peripheral, core, and all countries 
respectively. 
 
Table 3.1. Panel Unit Root Test – Im, Pesaran and Shin  
 























































































* indicates rejection of the null hypothesis of no-cointegration at 5% level of significance 
 
3.2.4 Lag Length Decision 
The standard information criteria (Akaike and the Schwartz) were employed to select the 
appropriate lag-length. The results can be found in Table 3.2. Taking into account the 
length of the data used in the panel VAR, these standard information criteria tests, and 
the panel VAR residual correlation LM tests (results presented in Table 3.3) a model with 
three lags was chosen for the “peripheral countries” model, two lags were used in the 
case of the “core countries”, and four lags were employed when taking the 14 countries 





Table 3.2. Lag Order Selection Criteria   
       
 Peripheral countries 
 
Core countries All countries 
        Lag AIC SC AIC SC AIC SC 
       
       0 -11.13296 -10.46391 -13.31107 -12.46117 -10.44827 -9.462424 
1 -11.77683 -10.57256 -16.32958  -15.10195* -13.86896 -12.60144 
2 -12.32679  -10.58728* -16.55004 -14.94467 -14.29229  -12.74310* 
3 -12.27219 -9.997449  -16.64674* -14.66364 -14.55119 -12.72033 
4 -12.31009 -9.500115 -16.60779 -14.24696  -14.66947* -12.55694 
5 -12.43994 -9.094724 -16.43356 -13.69499 -14.57275 -12.17854 
6 -12.44142 -8.560973 -16.30960 -13.19330 -14.52309 -11.84721 
7 -12.51399 -8.098314 -16.20319 -12.70916 -14.47074 -11.51319 
8  -13.00972* -8.058803 -16.24182 -12.37005 -14.50874 -11.26952 
       
        * indicates lag order selected by the criterion    
 AIC: Akaike information criterion   
 SC: Schwarz information criterion     
 
 






3.3. Dynamic Analysis   
The estimated parameters of the panel VAR for the “peripheral countries”, “core 
countries”, and for “all countries” can be found in Tables 3.4 to 3.6 of the Appendix, 
respectively. 
 
3.3.1 Impulse Response Functions 
To understand the impulse response functions (IRFs), one needs an estimate of their 
confidence interval. Being so, a 95 percent confidence band around estimates was 
included.  
 
• Peripheral countries 
The IRFs for the “peripheral countries” are plotted in Figs.3.1 to 3.3.   
 
 Peripheral countries Core countries All countries 
 Lags LM-Stat Prob LM-Stat Prob LM-Stat Prob 
 
1  25.87358  0.0558  21.25005  0.1691  15.49920  0.4884 
36 
 








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10






1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10








1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10







1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Response of DLGDP to DLPUBCONSUMP




Figure 3.1 shows the impact of a Cholesky one standard error positive shock to public 
consumption in this group of countries. The impact in public consumption persists over 
a 2-3 years period. The response of public investment is positive in both the estimated 
coefficient for the first lag and impulse responses. This is expected as public investment 
responds positively to an increase in GDP and to support the expansion of private 
investment. In fact, the average GDP of these five economies responds positively to a 
shock in public consumption. The impact on private investment is also positive and the 
peak response of private investment is approximately after a year and a half, thereafter 
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Response of DLGDP to DLPUBINV
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
 
As plotted in Figure 3.2, Cholesky one standard error positive shock to public investment 
presents an initial crowding-out effect in “peripheral countries”, as the impact on private 
investment is negative. In fact, macroeconomic rationale suggests that an increase in 
public investment can have two opposite effects on private investment, Aschauer 
(1989b) and Mittnik and Neumann (2000). As an increase in public investment is partly 
funded in the capital markets, this would lead to a reduction in the funds available to 
private investors and to an increase in interest rates charged by lenders, causing a 
decrease in the rate of return of private investment, and thus crowding-out of this type of 
investment. On the contrary, an increase in public investment results in an increase in 
domestic production, which allows private investors to become more optimistic about the 
future, and creating more favorable conditions for investment by the private sector. The 
response of public consumption seems to be positive in the first two years after a positive 
shock to public investment and, concerning GDP, it does not seem to react in a 
statistically significant manner. 
To investigate the role of private investment in the “peripheral countries” we show in 
Figure 3.3 the IRFs for a one standard error positive shock to this variable. We find that 
an increase in private investment does not have an immediate impact on public 
consumption. However, this variable will respond positively reaching the maximum 
impact approximately four years after the shock. One finds a similar behavior of public 
investment, that is, there is evidence of a crowding-in effect not immediately after the 
shock but approximately between the third and fifth year thereafter. GDP responds 
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positively to an increase of private investment, with this response reaching its greatest 
magnitude immediately after the shock. This positive answer persists over a period of 
five years, although in the third year the response does not seem to be statistically 
significant.   
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Response of DLGDP to DLPRIVINV
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
 
In conclusion, in the case of the “peripheral countries”,  the optimal measures to boost 
the economy seem to be either a positive shock to public consumption or a positive shock 
to private investment, as in both cases GDP will tend to increase and one will find 
crowding-in effects. The use of public consumption as a measure to help to improve the 
performance of these economies does not seem to be efficient, as GDP does not 
respond to it.  
 
 
• Core countries 
The IRFs for the “core countries” can be found in Figures 3.4 to 3.6.  Figure 3.4 shows 
that in this group of countries a Cholesky one standard error positive shock to public 
consumption persists over time, as it takes roughly five years to return to its previous 
value. Public investment responds positively in the first year after an increase in public 
consumption. This same result can be found in the estimated coefficient for the first lag. 
This may be due to a complementary effect between current and capital expenses. Such 
a policy change does not have a statistically significant impact on private investment, 
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except for a slight positive effect between the fourth and fifth year following the shock. 
The average output of these countries does not respond to changes in public 
consumption.   
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Response of LGDP to DLPUBCONSUMP
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
 
A Cholesky one standard error positive shock to public investment does not seem to be 
able to boost the output of these economies – much to the contrary, a statistically 
significant crowding-out effect occurs between the second and fourth year after the 
shock.  The impact of this change on public consumption is limited to a decrease in the 
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Response of LGDP to DLPUBINV
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
 
The role of private investment in the “core countries” is seen in Figure 3.6, in which the 
IRFs from a one standard error positive shock to this variable are plotted. The impact of 
this innovation seems to be positive and persistent over time, as public consumption, 
GDP, and private investment itself take four years to converge to their initial levels. In 
relation to the response of public investment we find a statistically significant crowding-
in effect approximately between the second and fourth year after the shock.  
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Concluding, in the case of the “core countries” the most adequate measure to help to 
improve economic growth seems to be an increase in private investment. 
 
• All countries 
The IRFs for the whole sample of the 14 countries are plotted in Figures 3.7 to 3.9. In 
the case of these countries a Cholesky one standard error positive shock to public 
consumption will impact positively in private investment and in GDP for about eight years 
after the shock, reaching, in both cases, its peak response between the second and third 
year. The effect on public investment is also positive, but in this case statistically 
significant in only the first two years after the change. These same results can be found 
in the estimated coefficient for the first lag. 
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Response of LGDP to DLPUBCONSUMP
Response to Cholesky One S.D. Innovations ± 2 S.E.
 
 
When we investigate the impact of a Cholesky one standard error positive shock to public 
investment we conclude that after the initial increase, mainly in the first year, public 
investment tends to decrease in the period between the second and the fifth year 
following the shock. This change does not impact public consumption or GDP in a 
statistically significant way. In terms of the response of private investment, we find a 
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As can be seen in Figure 3.9, a Cholesky one standard error positive shock to private 
investment leads to an initial increase in public consumption that persists over 
approximately 4 years. Relative to public investment we find a crowding-in effect 
between the second and third year after the shock, and later on, between the sixth and 
ninth year a crowding-out effect. The average GDP of the 14 countries shows behavior 
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similar to that of private investment, which is a persistent increase until the sixth year, 
naturally with a lower magnitude.  
In summary, the most efficient way to influence the economic performance of this group 
of countries, “all countries”, is to cause an increase in public consumption or in private 
investment.  
Taking into account the above analysis, it is clear that countries do not react in the same 
way to a rise in public consumption, public investment, or private investment. In fact, 
public consumption plays an active role only in those economies that suffered severe 
economic consequences in the recent crisis. Private investment allows a boost in the 
output of both the “peripheral countries” and the “core countries”.  
 
3.3.2 Variance Decomposition 
To study the relative importance of each random innovation in affecting the variables in 
the VAR, the Variance Decomposition (VD) was estimated. Tables 3.7 to 3.9 of the 
Appendix report the VD of public consumption, public investment, private investment, 
and GDP to the groups of the “peripheral countries”, “core countries”, and also of the “all 
countries”, respectively.  The results are in line with the IRFs analyzed previously. The 
first period decomposition for the first variable in the VAR ordering is due completely to 
its own innovation. 
In the case of the “peripheral economies” a shock to private investment can explain about 
2% of the variation of the fluctuation in public consumption in the second year after the 
innovation and about 38% at a five years horizon. That is, private investment has the 
power to explain about the same percentage of the variation of the fluctuation in public 
consumption as it has public consumption in itself.  Regarding public investment, a shock 
in public consumption can cause about 16% variation of the fluctuation in public 
investment and private investment about 18%. The forecast variation of private 
investment after a shock in this same variable is almost 69%, an innovation in public 
consumption being responsible for about 21% of the fluctuation in private investment. 
In “core countries” especially it is showed that at the five years horizon an impulse in 
private investment can explain about 13% variation of the fluctuation in public 
consumption, and only about 2% can be explained by an innovation on public 
investment. Regarding public investment, at a five year horizon almost 91% of the 
forecast variation is due to an innovation in public investment itself. Public consumption 
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and private investment contribute to about 4% and 3% of the forecast variation in public 
investment, respectively. Again, almost 89% of variation of the fluctuation in private 
investment can be justified by a shock in this same variable, and only about 6% and 4% 
can be explained by impulses in public investment and public consumption, respectively.  
Finally, if taking into account the 14 countries (“all countries”) and a time horizon of ten 
years, an innovation on private investment is responsible for almost 27% of the forecast 
variation of public consumption. Only about 3% variation of the fluctuation in public 
consumption is due to public investment. After a ten year period almost 63% of forecast 
variation in public investment is caused by a shock in public investment itself. An 
increase in public consumption can cause approximately 27% variation of the fluctuation 
in private investment,  an innovation on public investment is responsible for only about 
6% variation of the fluctuation in private investment, and a shock to private investment 
itself can explain almost 67% of variation of the forecast variation of private investment.   
 
3.3.3 Robustness tests 
To test the robustness of the model results to the number of lags employed in the PVAR, 
we re-estimated the PVAR models using four and five lags in the case of the “peripheral 
countries”, three and four lags concerning the “core countries”, and five and six lags 
when referring to the model with “all countries” included. These re-estimated models 
deliver similar, if not identical, results in terms of the impulse response functions. 
Although we order the variables in the model according to what is commonly adopted in 
the literature, we assess the sensitivity of the results to a change in this order, namely, 
ordering public investment as the most exogenous variable followed by public 
consumption, private investment, and GDP. In general, the results are very similar. The 




Based on a panel VAR technology and in particular on the Impulse Response Functions 
and Variance Decomposition, we analyzed the dynamic impacts of public consumption, 
                                                          




public investment, and private investment on GDP in the period 1995-2016 in two groups 
of countries: “peripheral countries” and “core countries”, which were classified according 
to the economic difficulties they faced in the recent crisis of 2008-2014.  
Our findings suggest that in the case of the “peripheral countries”  the optimal measure 
to boost the economy is to raise public consumption or private investment, as in both 
cases GDP will tend to increase and one will find crowding-in effects. On the contrary, 
an innovation to public investment does not seem to be efficient, as GDP does not 
respond to it and one finds a crowding-out effect on private investment. Concerning the 
“core countries”, the most adequate measure to improve economic growth seems to be 
an increase in private investment, as GDP does not respond at all to a shock to public 
consumption or to public investment. Finally, if one takes into account all 14 countries in 
this analysis, the most efficient way to influence the economic performance of this group 
of countries, “all countries”, is an increase in public consumption or in private investment, 
as GDP does not respond in a statistically significant way to a shock to public investment. 
It is clear from our analysis that countries do not react in the same way to shocks to 
public consumption, public investment, and private investment. In fact, public 
consumption plays an active role only in those economies that suffered severe economic 
consequences in the recent crisis. Private investment allows a boost in the output of both 
the “peripheral countries” and the “core countries”. There are several reasons to believe 
that during an economic crisis fiscal multipliers are larger, see Blanchard and Leigh 
(2013), in particular in countries that are below their productive capacity, as we assume 
is the case of the “peripheral countries”. As pointed out by Christiano, Eichenbaum and 
Rebelo (2011) central banks have less room to cut rates to offset negative impacts of 
fiscal consolidation on the economic activity, when nominal interest rates are near zero 
and a poorly functioning financial system creates significant constraints on credit grant 
which impacts both the current level of consumption and investment. On the other hand, 
Nailwaik (2011) and Sheets (2011) also pointed out that a country that presents a large 
output gap is more vulnerable to stall and slip into recession, as there are good reasons 
to believe that negative shocks in the economy, when growth is already very low, can 
lead to a number of vicious cycles. Taking these arguments into account, it is not 
surprising that an increase in public consumption only impacts on the “peripheral 
countries” GDP as those were the countries that suffered from severe economic 







                               Table 3.4.  Panel VAR Estimates - Peripheral countries 
          
 DLPUBCONSUMP DLPUBINV DLPRIVINV DLGDP 
          
DLPUBCONSUMP(-1)  0.342721  2.238042  1.445907  0.614468 
  (0.12866)  (1.13230)  (0.58567)  (0.21971) 
 










DLPUBCONSUMP(-3) -0.077571 -0.618157 -0.603828 -0.230923 
  (0.09250)  (0.81405)  (0.42106)  (0.15796) 
 
DLPUBINV(-1)  0.010027 -0.155003 -0.000503 -0.005433 
  (0.01546)  (0.13603)  (0.07036)  (0.02640) 
 
DLPUBINV(-2) -0.021925 -0.105321 -0.181791 -0.017061 
  (0.01531)  (0.13475)  (0.06970)  (0.02615) 
 
DLPUBINV(-3) -0.010054 -0.262639  0.120857  0.042650 
  (0.01556)  (0.13696)  (0.07084)  (0.02658) 
 
DLPRIVINV(-1) -0.062405 -0.339283  0.425921  0.137219 
  (0.03578)  (0.31486)  (0.16286)  (0.06110) 
 
DLPRIVINV(-2)  0.048716  0.836609 -0.330457  0.017390 
  (0.03597)  (0.31659)  (0.16375)  (0.06143) 
 
DLPRIVINV(-3) -0.016031 -0.085715  0.280541  0.179301 
  (0.03762)  (0.33103)  (0.17122)  (0.06423) 
 
DLGDP(-1)  0.418407  1.195704  0.546054  0.245421 
  (0.09596)  (0.84450)  (0.43681)  (0.16387) 
 
DLGDP(-2)  0.098029 -1.056546 -0.063706 -0.466385 
  (0.13818)  (1.21605)  (0.62899)  (0.23596) 
 
DLGDP(-3)  0.359521  1.261041 -0.444923 -0.215152 
  (0.14319)  (1.26012)  (0.65179)  (0.24452) 
 
C -0.010919 -0.052931  0.020734  0.045094 
  (0.00673)  (0.05923)  (0.03064)  (0.01149) 
 
D2  0.009692  0.055469 -0.049857 -0.030469 
  (0.00660)  (0.05810)  (0.03005)  (0.01127) 
 
D3  0.019906 -0.008226 -0.018996 -0.027274 
  (0.00684)  (0.06022)  (0.03115)  (0.01169) 
 
D4  0.012645  0.034125 -0.025201 -0.040752 
  (0.00736)  (0.06479)  (0.03351)  (0.01257) 
 
D5  0.009153 -0.021275 -0.036411 -0.031726 
  (0.00656)  (0.05771)  (0.02985)  (0.01120) 








Table 3.5 Panel VAR Estimates - Core countries 
     
      DLPUBCONSUMP DLPUBINV LPRIVINV LGDP 
     
     DLPUBCONSUMP(-1)  0.314191  0.531697  0.468288  0.129655 
  (0.08047)  (0.51699)  (0.44663)  (0.13488) 
 
DLPUBCONSUMP(-2) -0.142734 -0.729456  0.764631  0.223892 
  (0.07575)  (0.48671)  (0.42046)  (0.12697) 
 
DLPUBINV(-1) -0.014169 -0.418760 -0.019457 -0.013016 
  (0.01213)  (0.07792)  (0.06732)  (0.02033) 
 
DLPUBINV(-2) -0.005121 -0.045699 -0.209856 -0.027517 
  (0.01144)  (0.07347)  (0.06347)  (0.01917) 
 
LPRIVINV(-1)  0.023421 -0.154537  0.864744 -0.012425 
  (0.02121)  (0.13627)  (0.11772)  (0.03555) 
 
LPRIVINV(-2)  0.026035  0.389858 -0.240981 -0.043639 
  (0.02125)  (0.13654)  (0.11796)  (0.03562) 
 
LGDP(-1)  0.083944  0.935932  0.587246  1.000781 
  (0.07478)  (0.48047)  (0.41508)  (0.12535) 
 
LGDP(-2) -0.138280 -1.108540 -0.389579 -0.045059 
  (0.07029)  (0.45162)  (0.39015)  (0.11782) 
 
C  0.118257  0.034992  0.430067  0.505057 
  (0.06061)  (0.38944)  (0.33644)  (0.10160) 
 
D2  0.119432  0.430943 -0.536678  0.037839 
  (0.02826)  (0.18155)  (0.15684)  (0.04736) 
 
D3  0.015822 -0.111080  0.309468  0.191651 
  (0.02050)  (0.13174)  (0.11381)  (0.03437) 
 
D4  0.013825 -0.101692  0.268378  0.165126 
  (0.01782)  (0.11451)  (0.09892)  (0.02987) 
 
D5  0.016381 -0.006986  0.028705  0.045265 
  (0.00699)  (0.04490)  (0.03879)  (0.01171) 
 
D6 -0.003170 -0.012661 -0.032566 -0.018197 
  (0.00410)  (0.02637)  (0.02278)  (0.00688) 
 
D7 -0.003296  0.042645 -0.147038 -0.069037 
  (0.00779)  (0.05002)  (0.04321)  (0.01305) 
 
D8  0.124061  0.396953 -0.456936  0.105026 
  (0.03260)  (0.20942)  (0.18092)  (0.05463) 
 
D9  0.013384 -0.064696  0.246338  0.150952 
  (0.01567)  (0.10066)  (0.08696)  (0.02626) 
     
      











Table 3.6. Panel VAR Estimates - All countries 
      
       DLPUBCONSUMP  DLPUBINV LPRIVINV LGDP 
      
      DLPUBCONSUMP(-1)  0.408144   2.354341  1.357393  0.487779 




-0.424237  0.940556  0.148179 
  (0.07971)   (0.60362)  (0.37662)  (0.13090) 
 
DLPUBCONSUMP(-3)  0.026893 
 
 0.804096 -0.778602 -0.154785 




-1.000306  0.449188  0.096080 
  (0.06509)   (0.49295)  (0.30757)  (0.10690) 
 
DLPUBINV(-1)  0.005293 
 
-0.294511 -0.020669 -0.008150 




-0.121435 -0.170207 -0.015624 
  (0.01028)   (0.07783)  (0.04856)  (0.01688) 
 
DLPUBINV(-3)  0.002964 
 
-0.254689  0.024536  0.010576 
  (0.01028)   (0.07783)  (0.04856)  (0.01688) 
 
DLPUBINV(-4)  0.003149 
 
-0.212536  0.104936 -0.004425 




-0.335397  1.080399  0.053879 
  (0.02190)   (0.16584)  (0.10347)  (0.03596) 
 
LPRIVINV(-2)  0.089639 
 
 0.884198 -0.330849 -0.033140 




-0.618975  0.248481  0.072977 




 0.136242 -0.306034 -0.142359 
  (0.02244)   (0.16992)  (0.10602)  (0.03685) 
 
LGDP(-1)  0.272916 
 
 1.108419  0.705025  1.135691 




-2.282295 -1.289346 -0.644477 




 1.445981 -0.136963  0.108896 




-0.485097  0.881252  0.336484 
  (0.07576)   (0.57372)  (0.35796)  (0.12442) 
 
C  0.101154 
 
 0.961171  0.366168  0.588405 
  (0.07987)   (0.60487)  (0.37740)  (0.13118) 
 
D2  0.034506 
 
 0.420029 -0.444641  0.071585 
  (0.03947)   (0.29891)  (0.18650)  (0.06482) 
 
D3  0.035935 
 
 0.291724  0.253842  0.216185 




-0.149662 -0.127322 -0.063240 











  (0.00838)   (0.06349)  (0.03962)  (0.01377) 
 
D6  0.026925 
 
 0.076367  0.140102  0.117340 




Table 3.6. Panel VAR Estimates - All countries (cont.) 
 DLPUBCONSUMP  DLPUBINV LPRIVINV LGDP 
 
D7  0.030521 
 
 0.238106  0.218867  0.184105 
  (0.02218)   (0.16798)  (0.10481)  (0.03643) 
 
D8  0.025399 
 
 0.208810  0.169785  0.154078 
  (0.01966)   (0.14890)  (0.09290)  (0.03229) 
 
D9  0.016656 
 
 0.075428  0.015325  0.052777 




-0.037760 -0.018753 -0.017776 




-0.179553 -0.170797 -0.088592 




-0.091326 -0.115732 -0.072765 
  (0.00937)   (0.07094)  (0.04426)  (0.01538) 
 
D13  0.038163 
 
 0.489019 -0.360467  0.150536 
  (0.04596)   (0.34809)  (0.21718)  (0.07549) 
 
D14  0.029183 
 
 0.250602  0.194558  0.171157 
  (0.01936)   (0.14663)  (0.09149)  (0.03180) 
      























Table 3.7. Variance Decomposition - Peripheral countries 
 
 Variance Decomposition of DLPUBCONSUMP: 
 Period S.E. DLPUBCONSUMP DLPUBINV DLPRIVINV DLGDP 
      
       1  0.02  100  0  0  0 
 2  0.02  78.85  3.94  2.35  14.86 
 3  0.03  61.30  3.99  17.30  17.41 
 4  0.03  46.73  3.35  32.92  16.99 
 5  0.03  42.84  3.87  38.27  15.02 
 10  0.03  40.85  4.06  40.18  14.91 
 20  0.03  40.40  4.08  40.61  14.90 
 30  0.03  40.40  4.08  40.62  14.90 
      
       Variance Decomposition of DLPUBINV: 
 Period S.E. DLPUBCONSUMP DLPUBINV DLPRIVINV DLGDP 
      
       1  0.15  18.71  81.29  0  0 
 2  0.16  21.52  76.11  0.02  2.36 
 3  0.17  18.98  69.10  9.79  2.13 
 4  0.18  16.42  63.67  16.27  3.64 
 5  0.18  16.24  61.93  17.79  4.04 
 10  0.19  16.20  60.01  17.89  5.9 
 20  0.19  16.24  59.59  18.16  6.01 
 30  0.19  16.24  59.59  18.16  6.02 
      
       Variance Decomposition of DLPRIVINV: 
 Period S.E. DLPUBCONSUMP DLPUBINV DLPRIVINV DLGDP 
      
       1  0.08  7.98  5.60  86.41  0 
 2  0.10  21.30  3.93  73.50  1.27 
 3  0.10  20.59  6.25  68.72  4.44 
 4  0.10  21.12  6.06  68.24  4.59 
 5  0.10  20.56  5.90  68.88  4.67 
 10  0.11  21.35  5.84  67.73  5.09 
 20  0.11  21.25  5.81  67.74  5.20 
 30  0.11  21.25  5.81  67.74  5.20 
      
       Variance Decomposition of DLGDP: 
 Period S.E. DLPUBCONSUMP DLPUBINV DLPRIVINV DLGDP 
      
       1  0.03  9.62  2.18  41.21  46.99 
 2  0.04  23.99  1.77  42.30  31.95 
 3  0.04  25.10  2.45  41.61  30.84 
 4  0.04  23.76  2.82  44.49  28.93 
 5  0.04  21.94  2.79  48.33  26.94 
 10  0.04  22.43  3.06  47.12  27.39 
 20  0.04  22.36  3.09  47.45  27.10 
 30  0.04  22.36  3.09  47.46  27.09 
      
       Cholesky Ordering: DLPUBCONSUMP DLPUBINV DLPRIVINV DLGDP 













Table 3.8. Variance Decomposition – Core countries 
 
 Variance Decomposition of DLPUBCONSUMP: 
 Period S.E. DLPUBCONSUMP DLPUBINV LPRIVINV LGDP 
      
       1  0.01  100  0  0  0 
 2  0.01  93.63  0.83  4.85  0.69 
 3  0.01  87.85  1.16  10.28  0.71 
 4  0.01  85.36  1.49  12.28  0.86 
 5  0.01  84.57  1.83  12.65  0.95 
 10  0.01  83.99  1.97  12.64  1.39 
 20  0.01  83.67  1.97  12.65  1.71 
 30  0.01  83.63  1.97  12.65  1.76 
      
       Variance Decomposition of DLPUBINV: 
 Period S.E. DLPUBCONSUMP DLPUBINV LPRIVINV LGDP 
      
       1  0.07  3.55  96.45  0  0 
 2  0.08  3.03  94.66  0.26  2.05 
 3  0.08  3.68  91.34  2.18  2.81 
 4  0.08  3.73  90.66  2.82  2.79 
 5  0.08  3.77  90.43  3.02  2.77 
 10  0.08  3.82  90.30  3.07  2.81 
 20  0.08  3.82  90.27  3.08  2.84 
 30  0.08  3.82  90.26  3.08  2.84 
      
       Variance Decomposition of LPRIVINV: 
 Period S.E. DLPUBCONSUMP DLPUBINV LPRIVINV LGDP 
      
       1  0.06  0.00  1.26  98.74  0 
 2  0.09  0.31  1.24  97.82  0.63 
 3  0.10  1.75  4.67  92.36  1.22 
 4  0.10  3.29  5.45  89.80  1.46 
 5  0.11  4.23  5.71  88.33  1.73 
 10  0.11  4.63  5.76  87.49  2.12 
 20  0.11  4.63  5.76  87.36  2.25 
 30  0.11  4.63  5.76  87.34  2.28 
      
       Variance Decomposition of LGDP: 
 Period S.E. DLPUBCONSUMP DLPUBINV LPRIVINV LGDP 
      
       1  0.02  0.03  0.16  59.30  40.51 
 2  0.03  0.40  0.08  57.85  41.68 
 3  0.03  2.11  0.29  53.12  44.49 
 4  0.03  3.56  0.27  48.95  47.22 
 5  0.03  4.26  0.24  45.80  49.69 
 10  0.04  4.58  0.38  39.03  56.01 
 20  0.04  4.56  0.47  36.38  58.59 
 30  0.04  4.56  0.49  36.00  58.96 
      
       Cholesky Ordering: DLPUBCONSUMP DLPUBINV LPRIVINV LGDP 
      












Table 3.9. Variance Decomposition – All countries 
 
 
 Variance Decomposition of DLPUBCONSUMP: 
 Period S.E. DLPUBCONSUMP DLPUBINV LPRIVINV LGDP 
      
       1  0.01  100  0  0  0 
 2  0.02  90.72  0.78  2.14  6.36 
 3  0.02  79.09  1.05  12.88  6.98 
 4  0.02  75.11  1.06  17.53  6.30 
 5  0.02  74.66  1.46  17.27  6.61 
 10  0.02  63.24  3.34  26.73  6.69 
 20  0.02  62.64  3.47  27.29  6.60 
 30  0.02  62.55  3.47  27.38  6.60 
      
       Variance Decomposition of DLPUBINV: 
 Period S.E. DLPUBCONSUMP DLPUBINV LPRIVINV LGDP 
      
       1  0.11  18.12  81.88  0  0 
 2  0.11  19.93  77.75  0.08  2.25 
 3  0.12  18.65  73.65  4.08  3.63 
 4  0.12  18.18  73.15  4.68  3.99 
 5  0.12  18.77  72.63  4.67  3.93 
 10  0.13  18.05  69.41  7.89  4.65 
 20  0.13  18.26  69.00  7.99  4.74 
 30  0.13  18.27  68.97  8.01  4.75 
      
       Variance Decomposition of LPRIVINV: 
 Period S.E. DLPUBCONSUMP DLPUBINV LPRIVINV LGDP 
      
       1  0.07  2.21  2.74  95.05  0 
 2  0.11  9.01  2.22  87.86  0.92 
 3  0.14  17.59  4.76  76.61  1.03 
 4  0.16  20.13  5.98  72.96  0.93 
 5  0.17  22.48  5.46  71.16  0.89 
 10  0.18  26.80  5.53  66.46  1.21 
 20  0.18  27.51  5.40  65.91  1.18 
 30  0.18  27.63  5.38  65.81  1.19 
      
       Variance Decomposition of LGDP: 
 Period S.E. DLPUBCONSUMP DLPUBINV LPRIVINV LGDP 
      
       1  0.02  3.59  0.83  52.43  43.16 
 2  0.04  11.00  0.37  53.03  35.60 
 3  0.05  19.74  0.30  49.78  30.18 
 4  0.05  23.66  0.44  50.15  25.75 
 5  0.06  25.44  0.49  50.43  23.63 
 10  0.06  27.19  2.22  44.61  25.98 
 20  0.07  26.15  2.76  44.06  27.03 
 30  0.07  26.15  2.77  43.78  27.29 
      
       Cholesky Ordering: DLPUBCONSUMP DLPUBINV LPRIVINV LGDP 
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The euro area has been facing a slow, weak, and uneven recovery over the last decade. 
The output gap continues large and inflation is still below the ECB’s goal. After the 2007-
2008 crisis some euro area countries accumulated large and persistent current account 
deficits, and at the same time other member states presented high and persistent 
surpluses. For instance, at that time, the collective deficit of Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Portugal, and Spain corresponded to almost 7% of their GDP, while Germany and the 
Netherlands recorded an almost 6% surplus of their GDP. In fact, Germany has become 
one of the major surplus countries in the world, with a current account surplus of 7% of 
its GDP in 2012. Adding to this, real interest rates are expected to remain below their 




This situation has caused heated debates about the role of current account surplus 
countries in the European economy recovery. In fact, in advanced economies an 
increase in public investment is one of the few remaining policies available to push 
economic growth, and in developing economies an increase in infrastructure investment 
will allow the much needed expansion of these countries’ productive capacity. However, 
the magnitude of public investment multipliers and how public-debt-to-GDP ratios evolve 
in the presence of higher public investment is not consensual.      
From a theoretical point of view, there is evidence that an increase in public investment 
can have two opposite effects on private investment: see e.g. Aschauer (1989b) and 
Mittnik and Neumann (2000). On the one hand, an increase in public investment needs 
to be financed which may result, at least partially, in a reduction of  funds available to 
private investors and to an increase in interest rates charged, causing a decrease in 
private investment, thus leading to a crowding-out effect. Conversely, in a crowding in 
scenario, an increase in public investment can create more favorable conditions for 
private sector investment, especially through the development of facilities that can 
increase private capital productivity.  
To tackle these questions Dreger and Reimers (2014) explored the long-run relationship 
between public and private investment in the euro area, in terms of both capital stocks 
and gross investment flows using a panel vector autoregressive (VAR) model that 
accounted for international spillovers. The authors concluded that private investment 
reacts to shocks in public investment is rather exogenous and that the lack of public 
investment may have restricted private investment and GDP growth in the euro area. 
The International Monetary Fund (2014), using a structural VAR (SVAR) approach 
concludes that the macroeconomic impact of increasing public investment raises output 
in both the short and long term. On the other hand, Elekdag and Muir (2014) based on a 
dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model argued that higher German public 
investment would stimulate domestic demand in the short run, reduce the current 
account surplus, increase GDP in the longer-run and be associated with beneficial 
spillovers across the rest of the euro area. The authors highlighted that Germany should 
take advantage of the current low-interest rate environment. More recently, Blanchard, 
Erceg, and Lindé (2015), using a two country New Keynesian model and a large-scale 
DSGE model, tested the effects of a fiscal expansion by core euro area countries and 
how the periphery would be affected by this expansion. They concluded that periphery 
GDP expands as domestic demand is crowded in by lower real interest rates, net exports 
increase, and domestic demand expansion.  
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The present chapter contributes to this literature using a global vector autoregressive 
(GVAR) approach that, to the best of our knowledge, has not yet been used to test for 
the cross-country spillover effects of an increase in public and private investment in the 
euro area. We examine and quantify the impact of innovations to both public and private 
investment in a central European economy (Germany) and in a peripheral one (Portugal) 
into the majority of the European countries, USA and Japan.   
As a first exercise, we examine the effects of an exogenous shock on Germany’s  and 
Portugal’s public investment, by employing generalized impulse response functions 
(GIRFs), and then the impact of an exogenous shock on Germany’s and Portugal’s 
private investment.   
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the general 
literature about GVAR developments and its main applications, except for the question 
of public and private investment spillovers across countries that is presented in the 
introduction. Section 3 describes the macro-econometric framework underlying our 
empirical application. Section 4 describes the data, the GVAR model employed herein, 
and the estimation issues. Section 5 discusses the empirical results. Section 6 presents 
the concluding remarks. 
 
4.2. The GVAR approach: a literature review 
The GVAR modeling approach was introduced by Pesaran, Schuermann, and Weiner 
(2004). This model combines individual country-specific models in which domestic 
variables are related to country-specific foreign variables that match the relative 
importance of the rest of the world for the country under consideration, providing an 
effective way to deal with the curse of dimensionality. That is, it allows exploring 
international linkages of variables by linking country-specific 𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑋𝑋∗(𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖 ,𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖 ) 𝐼𝐼 = 1,2, … ,𝑁𝑁  
models, where 𝑋𝑋∗ is a vector of foreign variables that enters the country specific VAR 
models, and  𝐼𝐼 and 𝑞𝑞 are the domestic and foreign variables’ number of lags, 
respectively. Pesaran and Smith (2006) show that  𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑋𝑋∗ models can be derived as 
solutions of DSGE models, demonstrating also that short and long-run restrictions, if 
acceptable, can be imposed on them. On its turn, Dees, Holly, Pesaran, and Smith 
(2007) imposed restrictions on the long-run relationships of several variables by 
identifying the cointegrating vectors of the country-specific vector error-correction 
models (VECM). Dees, di Mauro, Pesaran, and Smith (2007) derive the GVAR 
methodology as an approximation to a global factor model. Chudik and Pesaran (2011, 
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2013) extended the GVAR approach, allowing for joint asymptotics and weak cross-
sectional dependence in errors in the stationary variables case. 
The GVAR framework has been applied to various fields. Dees, di Mauro, Pesaran, and 
Smith (2006) analyze the role of credit and explored the international linkages of the euro 
area by presenting a theoretical framework in which the GVAR is derived as an 
approximation to a global unobserved common factor model. Eickmeier and Ng (2011) 
focused on the transmission of credit supply shocks in the US, the euro area, and Japan 
to other economies and found that negative US credit supply shocks have stronger 
negative effects on domestic and foreign GDP as compared to euro area and Japan 
credit supply shocks. Domestic and foreign credit and equity markets also respond to 
the credit shocks, and exchange rate responses are consistent with a flight to quality to 
the US dollar.  
Xu (2012) also checked the role of bank credit on modeling and forecasting business 
cycle fluctuations and concluded that the incorporation of credit provides significant 
improvements in modeling and forecasting output growth, changes in inflation and long-
run interest rates, for countries with a developed banking sector. Using GIRF the author 
found strong evidence of spillovers of the US credit shocks to the euro area, Japan, and 
other industrialized economies. On the other hand, Pesaran, Schuermann, and Treutler 
(2006) proposed a model for exploring credit risk diversification across industry sectors 
and across different countries or regions using a GVAR model accounting for about 80% 
of world output.  
Monetary union membership counterfactual scenarios were presented by Pesaran, 
Smith, and Smith (2007) and by Dubois, Hericourt, and Mignon (2009). Pesaran, Smith, 
and Smith (2007) presented a counterfactual experiment of the UK’s and Sweden’s 
decisions not to join the EMU and concluded that output could have been higher and 
prices lower in the UK and in the euro area as a result of that entry. Dubois, Hericourt 
and Mignon (2009) also investigated counterfactual scenarios of a monetary union 
membership showing that the national monetary unification led to lower interest rates 
and higher output in most euro area countries when compared to a situation in which 
national monetary policies would have followed a German-type one. If British monetary 
preferences after September 1992 had beenwere adopted, this would have promoted 
higher interest rates, depreciation of national exchange rates, and higher output in most 
euro area countries.  
Although oil prices are included in the majority of these models as a global variable, i.e., 
as an important observed common factor, Cashin, Mohaddes, Raissi, and Raissi (2012) 
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employed a set of sign restrictions on the generalized impulse responses of a GVAR 
model to distinguish supply-driven from demand-driven oil price shocks and to study the 
time profile of their macroeconomic effects in different countries. Their results indicate 
that the supply-driven oil price shock economic consequences are very dissimilar from 
those of an oil-demand shock driven by global economic activity, and differ for oil-
importing countries compared to energy exporters. On this same subject, Chudik and 
Fidora (2012) found that supply shocks tend to have a stronger impact on emerging 
economies’ real output as compared to mature economies, have a negative impact on 
real growth in oil-exporting economies, and tend to cause an appreciation of oil exporters’ 
real exchange rates, but also lead to an appreciation of the US dollar.   
Regarding inflation, Galesi and Lombardi (2009) studied the short-run inflationary effects 
of oil and food price shocks, concluding that they are felt mostly in developed countries, 
while less sizeable effects are revealed in emerging economies. Anderton, Galesi, 
Lombardi, and di Mauro (2010) calculated the impact of increased imports from low-cost 
countries on manufacturing import prices and estimated Phillips curves to explore 
whether the inflationary process in OECD countries changed over time. Overall, the 
authors found that there are various significant pressures on global trade prices and labor 
associated with structural factors.  
The role of the US as a potentially globally dominant economy was investigated by Dées 
and Saint-Guilhem (2011). These authors concluded that countries with a large trade 
exposure to the US economy have a relatively greater sensitivity to US developments 
and also that the role of the US in the global economy has changed over time. Chudik 
and Smith (2013) extended the literature on the role of a globally dominant economy, 
once again the US, by comparing two models: one that treats the US as a globally 
dominant economy, and a standard version of a GVAR model that does not separate the 
impact of the US variables from the cross-section average of foreign economies, as in 
Dées, di Mauro, Pesaran, and Smith (2007).  
From a global imbalances perspective, Bettendorf (2012) showed that real GDP is a 
relatively unimportant variable compared to real exchange and interest rates and to the 
oil price, and also provides a counterfactual analysis of the US trade balance. Bussière, 
Chudik, and Sestieri (2012) studied the effects of demand shocks and shocks to relative 
prices on global imbalances, concluding that changes in domestic and foreign demand 
have a much stronger effect on trade flows than changes in relative trade prices.   
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To the best of our knowledge, the GVAR approach has not yet been used to test for 
cross-border spillover effects of an increase in public and private investment in the euro 
area.  
 
4.3. Econometric Methodology 
GVAR models (Pesaran et al., 2004) are designed to capture the dynamics of a large 
part of the world economy by linking country-specific VAR models to each other using, 
for instance, trade weights. Though GVAR models are linear, they allow for a range of 
different interdependencies between variables and countries, such as theory consistent 
long-run relationships, short-run spillover effects and cross-sectional dependence on the 
error structure. Thus, they offer a fair degree of flexibility in modeling business-cycle 
dynamics of the world economy in a coherent fashion. 
 
4.3.1 Structure of the model  
Basically a GVAR model consists of a number of country-specific models that are 
combined to form the global model. In a first step the country-specific models are 
estimated individually under certain restrictions. In a second step the GVAR model is 
solved by combining the individual models.  
For a brief illustration of the approach, consider a sample of 𝑁𝑁 + 1 different countries. 
Let 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 be the 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 x 1 vector of domestic random variables for country 𝐼𝐼 = 0, … ,𝑁𝑁 and time 
𝑡𝑡 = 1, … ,𝑇𝑇. For each country, we consider a VAR model that is augmented with a set of 
(weakly exogenous) foreign variables  and which is defined as VARX*. 
To simplify the notation but without loss of generality, we restrict our exposition to a 
VARX*(1,1) specification , i.e., 
                          𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖0 + 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖1𝑡𝑡 + Φ𝑖𝑖1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + Λ𝑖𝑖0𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡∗ + Λ𝑖𝑖1𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1∗ + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡                         (1) 
 
where 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖0, 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖1, Φ𝑖𝑖1, Λ𝑖𝑖0, and Λ𝑖𝑖1 are properly sized coefficient matrices measuring the 
impact of deterministic components, lagged domestic variables, and contemporaneous 
and lagged foreign variables, respectively. 
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Foreign variables are computed as a weighted average of domestic variables of all other 
countries based on trade weights 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡∗ = ∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=0 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡∗ , under the restriction that 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 0 and 
∑ 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1𝑁𝑁𝑗𝑗=0  . The assumption that 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗𝑡𝑡∗  is weakly exogenous at the individual country level 
reflects the belief that most countries are small relative to the world economy. 
Moreover, most existing papers on GVAR models make the assumption that the co-
variance matrix of 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is fixed. 
Pesaran et al. (2004) show how the 𝑁𝑁 + 1 country models can be combined to yield the 
GVAR representation. Defining a (𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 + 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖∗)x1 vector 𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡′ ,𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡∗
′
)′, collecting all 
contemporaneous terms on the left-hand side and ignoring deterministic terms for 
notational simplicity, (1) can be write equation as: 
                                                𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡                                                     (2) 
 
where 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖 = �𝐼𝐼𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 − Λ𝑖𝑖0� and 𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖 = (Φ𝑖𝑖1,Λ𝑖𝑖1) are both 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 x (𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 + 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖
∗) dimensional matrices. 
We collect all endogenous variables in a 𝑘𝑘x1 global vector 𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = (𝑥𝑥0𝑡𝑡′ ,𝑥𝑥1𝑡𝑡′ , … 𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡′ )′, where 
𝑘𝑘 = ∑ 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖=0  is the total number of endogenous variables in the GVAR. By defining a 
suitable (𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 + 𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖∗) x 𝑘𝑘 linking matrix 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖, it is possible to rewrite 𝒛𝒛𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊 exclusively in terms of 
𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 and 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖. More specifically, the linking matrix is set such that the following equality holds 
                                                        𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 𝑊𝑊𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡                                                             (3) 
 
Inserting (3) into (2) and stacking the models for all countries yields  
𝐺𝐺𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡 = 𝐻𝐻𝑋𝑋𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡 
 
where 𝐺𝐺 = ((𝐴𝐴0𝑊𝑊𝑜𝑜)′, (𝐴𝐴1𝑊𝑊1)′, … , (𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁)′)′, 𝐻𝐻 = ((𝐵𝐵0𝑊𝑊𝑜𝑜)′, (𝐵𝐵1𝑊𝑊1)′, … , (𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁𝑊𝑊𝑁𝑁)′)′ and 
𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡= ≔ (𝜀𝜀0𝑡𝑡′ , … , 𝜀𝜀𝑁𝑁𝑡𝑡′ )′. 
Multiplying from the left by 𝐺𝐺−1 yields the reduced-form GVAR representation: 




where 𝐹𝐹: = 𝐺𝐺−1𝐻𝐻 and 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡: = 𝐹𝐹 = 𝐺𝐺−1𝜀𝜀𝑡𝑡. Equation (4) resembles a standard first-order 
reduced form VAR. The structure of the VARX* model induces restrictions on the 
parameter matrix 𝐹𝐹. In addition to the restrictions imposed on 𝐹𝐹, the model structure has 
important implications for the specific form of the variance-covariance matrix of 𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡, Σ𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡. In 
the present application, Σ𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 is a positive definite matrix, given by: 
Σ𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 = 𝐺𝐺−1Σ𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺−1 
 
where Σ𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 is a block-diagonal matrix that consists of the country-specific variance-
covariance matrices Σ𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡. The block-diagonality of Σ𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 is predicated by the fact that the 
weakly exogenous variables inclusion accounts for cross-country correlation and renders 





Quarterly data were used from 1997Q1 to 2014Q4 for 16 countries: Austria (AT), Belgium 
(BE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), Germany (DE), Greece (GR), Ireland 
(IE), Italy (IT), Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES), Sweden (SE), United 
Kingdom (UK), United States (US), and Japan (JP). The GVAR model includes three 
country-specific variables for each country’s VARX* model: Private Investment (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡), 
Public Investment (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡), and GDP (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡).  
All variables are presented at constant prices and in growth rates of the original values. 
GDP was transformed into real values using the GDP price deflator. GDP and GDP price 
deflator data are obtained from the OECD. Yearly private investment and private 
investment price deflator’s data were collected from AMECO. To transform these data 
from annual to quarterly, we took advantage of the Ecotrim program. The gross fixed 
capital formation (GFCF) and the gross fixed capital formation price deflator from the 
OECD database were used as indicators. The data for the annual public investment and 
the annual public Investment price deflator were also collected from AMECO. Once 
again, we used the Ecotrim program, but in this case no indicator was applied.  
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A simple average was applied to oil price data to transform the series from a monthly to 
a quarterly frequency. The source for the oil price data was the IMF cross-country 
macroeconomic statistics. 
Foreign-specific variables were constructed using trade-based weights that were fixed 
over time and computed using the average of exports and imports cross-country data, 
for the period 1999-2014. The data source for the weight matrix was the IMF.  
Finally, we also used, for comparison purposes, the average Purchasing Power Parity 
GDPs of all countries included in this model over the 2000-2015. 
All models include the country-specific foreign-variables, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡∗ , 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡∗  and 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡∗  and the log 
of the oil price (𝑙𝑙𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡) as weakly exogenous variables, with the exception of the US model. 
In the case of the US, the price of oil was included as an endogenous variable.  
 
4.4.2 Trade Weights  
The country-specific foreign variables are constructed using a time-fixed weight matrix. 
The trade shares are given in the 16 X 16 trade share matrix provided in Table 4.1 of the 
Appendix, each column containing the 1999-2014 shares of exports and imports. Most 
weights are small with some exceptions, namely Austria vis-à-vis Germany (50.5%), and 
Japan vis-à-vis UK (62.7%).  
 
4.4.3 Unit Root Tests 
A series of unit root tests was used to investigate whether or not the macroeconomic 
variables used are integrated processes. Tables 4.2 and 4.3 of the Appendix report 
results for the traditional Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests on levels with trend and 
no trend, first and second differences, for all domestic and foreign variables. The lag 
order of the ADF test statistics is determined by the minimization of the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). The maximum lag allowed was 4. The Weighted Symmetric 
DF tests were also computed based on related regressions with the corresponding lag 
order chosen by AIC. Results of these tests on levels and, first and second differences 
are reported in Table 4.4 of the Appendix (domestic variables) and in Table 4.5 of the 
Appendix (foreign variables). Both ADF and Weighted Symmetric DF test results indicate 
that the unit root null hypothesis cannot be rejected for most variables in most countries 
at the 5% significance level, i.e. most variables are I(1). 
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4.4.4 Estimation of the Country-specific   
The presence of non-stationary variables makes the traditional OLS regressions in levels 
no longer valid. However taking into account that the majority of the variables have a unit 
root, each country-VARX* model was estimated individually with the restriction that both 
foreign and global variables are weakly exogenous variables. In the current application, 
the reduced rank regressions are used in the case of unrestricted intercepts and no 
trends (e.g. case III in Pesaran, Shin and Smith 2000). Table 4.8 presents the number 
of cointegration relationships in the individual VARX* models. We used the critical values 
obtained in Mackinnon, Haug and Michelis (1999).   
 
4.4.5 Testing for Weak Exogeneity 
Weak exogeneity of all foreign and global variables (𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡∗ ) is an important assumption of 
the VARX* model and it is required for the estimated country-specific VARX* models to 
be stacked together and solved as one system. Assuming that the variables are weakly 
exogenous, is basically considering that all countries are small economies with respect 
to the rest of the world.  
Pesaran, Schuermann and Weiner (2004)  provide three conditions that the model 
should fulfil so that all star variables can be assumed to be weakly exogenous: (i) the 
global model should be stable, (ii) all the weights used in the construction of the foreign-
specific variables should be relatively small and (iii) the individual country-specific shocks 
are cross-sectionally weakly correlated. As further discussed in Pesaran, Shuermann 
and Weiner (2004), weak exogeneity assumption is also compatible with a certain degree 
of weak dependence across the errors. Whereas, according to Johansen (1992) and 
Granger and Lin (1995), the weak exogeneity assumption in cointegrating models imply 
no long run feedback from 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 to 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡∗ , without necessarily ruling out lagged short run 
feedback between the two sets of variables. In this case, 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡∗  is said to be ‘long run forcing’ 
for𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, which directly implies that the error correction terms of the individual country 
VECMX* models do not enter the marginal model of 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡∗ .   
A formal test based on the weak exogeneity assumption for the country-specific foreign 
variables and the observed global variables can be conducted as described in Johansen 
(1992) and Harbo, Johansen, Nielsen and Rahbek (1998). It involves the computation of 

















𝑗𝑗 , j = 1, 2, ...,   are the estimated error correction terms,  𝐼𝐼  is the number 
of cointegrating relations found for the ith country model; ∆𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑘𝑘,  k = 1, …, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼,  and 
∆𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−𝑖𝑖∗ , m = 1, …, q𝐼𝐼, are sets of lags of the first difference of the domestic and foreign 
variables, respectively, and 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 and q𝐼𝐼, are the lag orders of the domestic and foreign 
components of each ith country model. Hence, the test for weak exogeneity is an F-test 
of the joint null hypothesis that 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗,𝑙𝑙 = 0, 𝑗𝑗=1,2,…, 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 (see e.g. Galesi and Lombardi, 
2009).  
Table 4.6 presents weak exogeneity test results. The weak exogeneity assumption could 
not be rejected for the majority of variables considered. In fact, only 12 out of the 59 
cases analyzed were found to be statistically significant at the 5% level.   
 
4.4.6 Impact Elasticities 
The coefficient estimates of the contemporaneous foreign variables in differences, also 
called impact elasticities, were obtained from the estimation of each country-VECMX* 
model. These estimates present the contemporaneous variation of a domestic variable 
caused by a one percent change in its corresponding foreign-specific counterpart 
allowing to identify co-movements among variables across different countries.  The 
results can be found in table 4.7. 
 
4.4.7 Robustness of the GVAR results to time-varying weights 
To test the robustness of the model results we performed different analyses. First, time-
varying weights were computed based on a three-years wide rolling window so that 
possible changes in the trade profile of the countries were taken into account. Overall, 
we did not find significant changes in the results. Secondly, we estimated the model only 
for the period between 1997Q1 until 2007Q4, excluding in that matter the financial crisis 
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from the sample.2 Once again, the results remained mainly the same. These results are 
available from the authors upon request. 
 
4.5. Dynamic Analysis 
The dynamic properties of our GVAR were tested by means of the GIRFs. The concept 
of GIRFs was introduced by Koop, Pesaran, and Potter (1996) and applied to the VAR 
analysis by Pesaran and Shin (1998). In a GVAR context of multi-countries and several 
variables, GIRFs are preferable to the standard IRFs proposed by Sims (1980), which 
assume orthogonal shocks. It is known that if IRFs are calculated using different orders 
of variables, then the shape of the IRFs will be different. In fact, if the model is estimated 
using a reduced number of variables, a relationship between the variables can be 
inferred based on economic theory. However, this approach is not valid for the GVAR 
model given that it typically contains a large number of variables. Moreover, traditional 
IRFs are difficult to use in a GVAR since there is no realistic way to order the countries 
in the model. 
 
4.5.1 Generalized Impulse Response Functions 
In this chapter, we analyze the consequences of shocks to both public and private 
investment in a central European economy (Germany) and in a peripheral one (Portugal).  
The GIRFs of the shocks analyzed are plotted in Figures 4.1 through 4.12. For each 
country, the graphs show the dynamic response of each variable over a simulation 
horizon of 20 quarters, including the confidence intervals at the 90 percent significance 
level computed with 1000 bootstrap replications of the GVAR model.3 We are aware that 
most of the responses appear to not be statistically significant. However, this is justified 




                                                          
2 Results for the 1997Q1-2007Q4 sample are available upon request. 




4.5.1.1 Shock to Public Investment 
As a first exercise, and as mentioned above, we investigate if countries with a surplus 
account, such as Germany, can help boost weaker European economies through cross-
country spillover effects of an increase in public investment.  
The graphs in Figures 4.1 to 4.3 include the GIRFs from a one standard error positive 
shock to Germany’s public investment4.  
 









                                                          
4 The GVAR model is a linear model, so resizing the model is straightforward.  
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A positive response is estimated in almost all countries’ GDP after the second quarter 
following a positive standard error unit shock to public investment in Germany. However, 
these increases do not appear to be statistically significant, not even in Germany itself.  
Private investment reacts negatively immediately after this shock in Austria and Belgium. 
Specifically, Austria’s private investment decreases an average of 0.003% in the first four 
quarters following the shock, and Belgium’s private investment 0.005%. In Germany the 
reaction of private investment is positive, which suggests a crowding-in effect. However 
it is not statistically significant, as is also the case for the remaining countries. Public 
investment reacts positively in Austria, Germany, Netherlands, and Sweden, with the 
average response for the first six quarters after the shock being 0.006% in Austria and 
Germany, 0.003% in Netherlands, and 0.004% in Sweden. On the contrary, a stimulus 
in Germany’s public investment has a negative impact in Portugal of 0.008%, but only in 
the quarter immediately following the shock. As expected, as the oil price is an 
exogenous variable to all countries, except for the USA, the impact of a shock to public 
investment in Germany is not statistically significant. (Figure 4.13 of the Appendix). 
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Concerning the effects of a positive impulse of one standard error in public investment 
in a small open economy such as Portugal, as one would probably expect, GDP does 
not react in a statistically significant way in any foreign country and also not in Portugal. 
(Figure 4.4). Figure 4.5 shows that in relation to private investment, it responds positively 
and in a statistically significant way only in Portugal, which points to a crowding-in effect 
in this economy, at least in the short run. In relation to public investment, it reacts in a 
negative way in the first quarter immediately after the shock in Germany and Belgium, 
decreasing also in France 0.001% on average in the first three quarters after the impulse. 
On the other hand, it has a positive impact in Spanish public investment of 0.004%, on 
average, in the first three quarters after the impulse and of 0.03% in the first four quarters 
in the Portuguese public investment (Figure 4.6). Oil prices increase, but this is not 
statistically significant (Figure 4.14 of the Appendix). 
 
4.5.1.2 Shock to Private Investment 
To investigate the role of Germany’s private investment, we show in Figures 4.7 to 4.9 
the GIRFs from a one standard error positive shock to this variable.  
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GDP it does seem to not react in a statistically significant manner in any of the economies 
analyzed. (Figure 4.7). Figure 4.8 presents the GIRFs of private investment after a shock 
in Germany’s private investment. In fact, Germany’s private investment positive 
innovations do not impinge significantly on other countries’ private investment, except in 
the case of neighboring economies, namely, Netherlands and Sweden and Germany 
itself.  
 






With regard to private investment, it stimulates public investment in Germany and in 
neighboring countries such as Netherlands and Sweden. In particular, Germany’s public 
investment rises by 0.007% on average in the first five quarters after a one standard 
error positive shock to private investment in Germany. While the effect is not significant 
immediately following the shock, it becomes statistically significant from the second to 
the fourth quarter, increasing on average 0.006%. Sweden’s public investment reacts in 
a statistically significant way in only the third and fourth quarters, increasing on average 
Japan
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0.002% (Figure 4.9). As can be seen in Figure 4.15 of the Appendix, the oil price does 
not respond in a statistically significant way.  
  





The results from a one standard error impulse in Portugal’s private investment are 
presented in graphs 4.10 to 4.12. A positive shock to private investment in Portugal does 
not seem to stimulate GDP in any of the economies considered in a significant manner 
(Figure 4.10). As can be seen in Figure 4.12, private investment raises Portuguese public 
investment by 0.013%, on average, in the seven periods following the shock. Portuguese 
private investment positive innovations do not impinge significantly on other countries’ 
private investment. (Figure 4.11). Concerning the impact on private investment, it shows 
a statistically significant response only in Portugal. As expected, this shock has no impact 
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Based on a GVAR technology, and in particular on the Generalized Impulse Response 
Functions, we investigated the impact of innovations to both public and private 
investment in Germany, a central European economy that is one of the major surplus 
countries in the world, and in Portugal, a peripheral European economy. Quarterly data 
were used from 1997Q1 to 2014Q4 for 16 countries. The GVAR model includes three 
country-specific variables for each country’s VARX* model: Private Investment (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡), 
Public Investment (𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡), and GDP (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡). Foreign-specific variables were constructed 
using trade-based weights that were fixed over time and computed using the average of 
exports’ and imports’ cross-country data, for the period 1999-2014. 
Our findings suggest a positive response (with a two quarter delay) in almost all 
countries’ GDP to a public investment shock in Germany. However, these increases do 
not achieve statistical significance, not even in Germany itself.  Private investment reacts 
negatively and immediately after this shock in Austria and Belgium. In Germany we find 
evidence of a crowding-in effect, as the reaction of private investment is positive. 
However, it is not statistically significant, which is also the case for the remaining 
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countries. Following a shock to public investment in Germany, public investment 
increases in neighboring countries such as Austria, Netherlands, and Sweden. On the 
contrary, a stimulus in Germany’s public investment has a negative impact on 
Portuguese public investment but only in the quarter immediately after the shock.   
Concerning a similar shock in a small open economy such as Portugal, GDP does not 
react in a statistically significant way in any foreign country and also not in Portugal itself. 
Regarding private investment, it does respond positively and in a statistically significant 
way, but in Portugal only, pointing to a crowding-in effect in this economy, at least in the 
short run. Public investment reacts in a negative way in the first quarter immediately after 
the shock in Germany and Belgium, decreasing also in France in the first three quarters 
after the impulse. On the contrary, it shows a positive impact on Spanish and Portuguese 
public investment. 
We also find evidence that after an innovation in Germany’s private investment, GDP 
does not reacting in a statistically significant way.This shock shows also a positive effect 
in public investment in Germany and in neighboring countries such as the Netherlands 
and Sweden, pointing to a crowding-in effect. A one standard error impulse in 
Portuguese private investment does not seem to stimulate GDP significantly in any of 
the economies considered, as one might expect from a small open economy. This shock 
shows a positive impact in Portuguese public investment, pointing also to a crowding-in 
effect. However, it does not seem to influence other countries’ private investment. 
The main conclusion from this study is that even if Germany increases its public 
investment it will not have the desired positive impact on peripheral economies. In fact, 
one finds statistically significant cross-border effects mainly in neighboring countries, and 
the magnitude of those impacts is modest.  
Finally, concerning crowding-in and crowding-out effects, we find that only Germany’s 
private investment is able to crowd-in public investment, while public investment does 
not seem to have any impact on Germany’s private investment. In the case of Portugal 
we find that both public and private investment show a crowding-in effect.   






Note: Trade weights are displayed in each column by country, as shares of exports and imports in 1999-2014. Columns, but not rows, sum up to one. The 
countries considered in the analysis are: Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Denmark (DK), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Ireland (IE), Italy (IT), Netherlands 




Table 4.1. Trade weights 
 
 AT BE DK FI FR DE GR IE IT NL PT ES SE UK US JP 
AT 0 0.013 0.011 0.019 0.014 0.091 0.019 0.006 0.040 0.018 0.008 0.012 0.015 0.010 0.009 0.005 
BE 0.024 0 0.023 0.030 0.111 0.081 0.030 0.165 0.048 0.169 0.043 0.041 0.072 0.083 0.077 0.030 
DK 0.010 0.010 0 0.015 0.010 0.026 0.015 0.008 0.012 0.017 0.010 0.009 0.108 0.008 0.016 0.003 
FI 0.008 0.008 0.039 0 0.007 0.016 0.015 0.005 0.008 0.013 0.007 0.005 0.100 0.008 0.010 0.006 
FR 0.070 0.222 0.065 0.079 0 0.166 0.079 0.072 0.200 0.118 0.160 0.265 0.078 0.095 0.125 0.035 
DE 0.505 0.246 0.251 0.229 0.240 0 0.229 0.099 0.228 0.330 0.175 0.161 0.164 0.150 0.163 0.093 
GR 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.063 0.012 0.011 0 0.005 0.030 0.009 0.005 0.014 0.007 0.005 0.008 0.004 
IE 0.005 0.008 0.017 0.005 0.010 0.009 0.005 0 0.007 0.011 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.029 0.103 0.007 
IT 0.132 0.065 0.044 0.233 0.127 0.105 0.233 0.044 0 0.066 0.050 0.121 0.049 0.049 0.056 0.025 
NL 0.030 0.160 0.068 0.050 0.062 0.109 0.050 0.052 0.042 0 0.050 0.047 0.081 0.116 0.113 0.069 
PT 0.006 0.008 0.007 0.014 0.020 0.014 0.014 0.005 0.018 0.010 0 0.126 0.008 0.005 0.010 0.003 
ES 0.036 0.043 0.037 0.015 0.127 0.068 0.063 0.040 0.104 0.043 0.320 0 0.039 0.031 0.060 0.017 
SE 0.018 0.019 0.185 0.020 0.019 0.035 0.020 0.014 0.017 0.025 0.015 0.013 0 0.016 0.031 0.008 
UK 0.076 0.073 0.086 0.102 0.096 0.125 0.102 0.235 0.124 0.050 0.058 0.056 0.124 0 0.193 0.627 
US 0.058 0.106 0.125 0.118 0.122 0.122 0.118 0.222 0.099 0.114 0.090 0.109 0.122 0.169 0 0.067 















AT BE DK FI FR DE GR IE IT NL PT ES SE UK US JP 
y (with trend) -3045 -1.93 -1.63 -2.38 -1.41 -1.96 -3.15 -1.50 -2.17 -163 -2.39 -2.03 -0.93 -2.25 -2.08 -2.03 -2.20 
y (no trend) -2.89 -2.6 -2.08 -2.24 -2.84 -2.67 -0.97 -1.80 -3.39 -2.14 -3.01 -2.83 -2.29 0.611 -1.37 -2.59 -1.14 
Dy -2.89 -4.17 -4.69 -4.12 -3.30 -3.09 -4.46 -1.88 -2.28 -2.54 -3.13 -3.37 -2.34 -4.72 -3.84 -2.18 -4.93 
DDy -2.89 -6.69 -6.94 -5.59 -10.19 -6.95 -8.51 -11.73 -7.77 -6.25 -7.44 -7.1 -8.82 -4.53 -5.47 -8.79 -6.63 
ipub (with trend) -3.45 -1.38 -1.99 -4.62 -4.16 -1.07 -2.08 -1.95 -1.12 -0.75 -1.62 -1.64 -6.36 -2.17 -1.11 -0.58 -1.31 
ipub (no trend) -2.89 -0.55 -0.89 -0.77 0.55 -2.65 -2.09 -2.37 -2.15 -1.71 -2.10 -1.30 -2.69 -0.19 -1.06 -1.65 -5.14 
Dipub -2.89 -4.28 -3.33 -3.34 -3.43 -3.73 -2.57 -2.60 -1.74 -2.93 -2.81 -2.53 -3.94 -4.57 -3.05 -1.30 -3.55 
DDipub -2.89 -5.64 -6.06 -2.95 -4.86 -4.09 -4.27 -4.39 -4.93 -14.08 -4.48 -4.87 -2.61 -4.96 -8.74 -1.89 -6.33 
ipriv (with trend) -3.45 -3.71 -1.99 -1.83 -1.15 -2.42 -3.84 -1.68 -1.59 -1.24 -3.01 -2.86 -2.02 -4.48 -2.35 -3.08 -2.90 
ipriv (no trend) -2.89 -3.51 -1.54 -1.73 -2.30 -2.99 -2.78 -1.34 -1.77 -1 -3.08 -1.39 -2.28 -1.82 -1.96 -2.66 -2.78 
Dipriv -2.89 -3.64 -4.58 -5.30 -3.12 -3.47 -4.25 -2.,94 -6.32 -3.28 -4.78 -3.04 -2.36 -4.52 -4.21 -2.88 -3.05 















Value AT BE DK FI FR DE GR IE IT NL PT ES SE UK US JP 
y (with trend) -3.24 -1.02 -0.93 -1.70 -0.42 -0.51 -3.15 -1.52 -0.24 -1.03 -0.20 -0.82 -1.20 -2.68 -1.88 -1.68 -2.50 
y (no trend) -2.55 112 1.23 0.14 0.84 119 0.50 -1.25 1.67 -0.74 0.26 0.13 -0.32 1.27 0.68 2.22 0.87 
Dy -2.55 -4.30 -4.63 -4.26 -3.19 -3.06 -4.58 -1.87 -1.90 -272 -2.94 -3.39 -2.59 -5.03 -4.08 -2.18 -5.22 
DDy -2.55 -7.00 -7.00 -5.32 -10.47 -7.16 -8.72 -12.00 -8.02 -6.55 -7.76 -7.35 -8.91 -5.06 -5.63 -8.82 -6.83 
ipub (with trend) -3.24 0.15 -1.63 -4.21 -3.70 -1.08 -1.07 -1.89 -1.53 -1.25 -1.89 -2.11 -4.51 0.61 -1.33 -0.84 -1.19 
ipub (no trend) -2.55 -0.89 1.28 -0.99 1.21 -1.68 -1.66 -1.78 -1.51 -132 -0.66 -2.39 -2.02 -1.36 -0.64 -0.78 -1.24 
Dipub -2.55 -1.16 -2.39 -3.71 -1.10 -1.72 -1.30 -2.83 -2.04 -3.19 -3.11 -1.46 -4.12 -0.72 -3.03 -1.62 -3.10 
Ddipub -2.55 -3.51 -2.95 -1.59 -1.24 -2.45 -1.87 -4.58 -5.18 -14.48 -4.69 -3.85 -2.73 -2.89 -9.13 -1.91 -0.80 
ipriv (with trend) -3.24 -3.39 -2.14 -1.12 -0.20 -1.25 -4.00 -1.38 -1.23 -0.51 -2.48 -1.55 -1.39 -4.55 -2.05 -2.48 -2.88 
ipriv (no trend) -2.55 -2.61 -0.21 -1.23 0.07 0.38 -2.55 -1.67 -0.96 -0.52 -2.20 -1.68 -1.11 -0.73 -2.20 -2.62 -2.27 
Dipriv -2.55 -3.87 -4.76 -4.99 -2.59 -3.62 -4.41 -3.06 -6.54 -3.52 -4.93 -2.,65 -2.40 -4.89 -4.19 -3.01 -3.21 






















Foreign Variables AT BE DK FI FR DE GR IE. IT NL PT ES SE UK US JP 
ys (with trend) -2.52 -1.83 -2.36 -1.86 -1.85 -1.97 -2.00 -2.05 -1.96 -2.39 -1.54 -2.05 -1.94 -2.21 -2.26 -2.12 
ys (no trend) -1.59 -2.11 -2.10 -2.34 -2.31 -2.93 -2.28 -1.98 -1.85 -1.91 -2.04 -2.17 -2.31 -2.56 -2.80 -2.10 
Dys -4.02 -3.64 -4.13 -3.68 -3.81 -3.33 -3.81 -3.61 -3.54 -3.86 -3.01 -3.51 -3.64 -4.20 -3.22 -3.74 
DDys -7.33 -7.22 -5.20 -6.67 -6.77 -5.95 -6.60 -6.27 -6.48 -6.77 -6.19 -6.41 -6.78 -7.63 -5.19 -5.69 
ipubs (with trend) -1.78 -1.12 -1.36 -0.11 -0.98 -0.05 -0.13 -0.20 -1.20 -1.73 -1.64 -0.96 -0.85 -4.75 -0.50 -0.77 
ipubs (no trend) -2.11 -2.39 -1.95 -2.19 -2.05 -1.96 -2.11 -1.67 -2.05 -2.06 -2.54 -1.83 -1.48 -2.06 -2.07 -1.28 
Dipubs -2.01 -1.74 -1.96 -1.81 -1.18 -1.34 -1.55 -1.77 -1.64 -1.42 -1.36 -1.45 -1.59 -2.87 -1.54 -2.79 
Ddipubs -6.27 -3.85 -4.02 -6.84 -3.68 -3.81 -6.95 -4.67 -3.88 -3.00 -287 -4.96 -7.51 -3.98 -4.27 -8.62 
iprivs (with trend) -3.65 -3.19 -3.42 -2.59 -2.65 -2.68 -2.74 -2.66 -2.73 -3.31 -2.56 -2.87 -2.64 -3.62 -2.31 -2.51 
iprivs (no trend) -3.65 -3.27 -3.38 -2.66 -2.69 -2.76 -2.75 -2.57 -2.82 -3.28 -2.71 -2.84 -2.68 -3.66 -2.42 -2.19 
Diprivs -4.18 -3.33 -3.94 -3.07 -3.26 -3.19 -3.46 -3.34 -3.10 -3.96 -2.98 -3.36 -3.26 -3.31 -3.70 -3.94 
Ddiprivs -5.10 -5.11 -4.98 -7.74 -5.26 -7.31 -5.52 -6.92 -4.91 -5.08 -5.87 -4.83 -5.10 -5.62 -8.60 -6.92 
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Foreign Variables AT BE DK FI FR DE GR IE IT NL PT ES SE UK US JP 
ys (with trend) -2.01 -0.78 -0.90 -1.17 -0.87 -0.44 -1.00 -1.41 -1.32 -1.46 -1.08 -1.03 -0.86 -0.84 -0.61 -1.41 
ys (no trend) 0.61 1.07 1.61 0.78 0.98 1.11 0.88 1.00 0.73 0.98 0.59 0.76 0.95 0.39 1.19 0.76 
Dys -4.05 -3.40 -4.14 -3.60 -3.78 -3.15 -3.78 -3.56 -3.52 -3.88 -3.05 -3.38 -3.55 -4.01 -2.88 -3.88 
 
 
DDys -7.50 -6.97 -5.37 -6.82 -6.89 -6.16 -6.77 -6.35 -6.61 -6.96 -6.38 -6.53 -6.77 -7.61 -5.70 -5.90 
ipubs (with trend) -2.15 -1.89 -1.94 -1.04 -1.74 -1.13 -1.20 -0.98 -1.90 -2.13 -2.28 -1.41 -1.38 -4.86 -1.31 -1.22 
ipubs (no trend) -1.47 -1.39 -1.28 -0.99 -1.16 -1.09 -1.12 -0.51 -1.40 -1.09 -1.57 -1.07 -0.36 -0.47 -1.09 -0.62 
Dipubs -1.78 -1.57 -1.67 -2.04 -1.57 -1.44 -1.75 -1.98 -1.66 -1.56 -1.77 -1.78 -1.92 -2.85 -1.76 -2.77 
DDipubs -6.32 -3.85 -4.09 -7.08 -3.92 -3.99 -7.19 -4.96 -3.99 -3.24 -2.73 -5.24 -7.89 -1.62 -4.49 -9.00 
iprivs (with trend) -3.03 -2.04 -2.56 -1.34 -1.68 -1.59 -1.71 -1.70 -1.70 -2.36 -1.71 -1.34 -1.54 -2.81 -1.50 -2.02 
iprivs (no trend) -2.62 -1.59 -1.93 -1.90 -1.56 -1.40 -1.64 -1.77 -1.41 -1.55 -1.27 -1.23 -1.40 -2.73 -1.19 -2.22 
Diprivs -4.26 -3.41 -4.08 -3.10 -3.32 -3.23 -3.51 -3.35 -317 -4.05 -3.13 -3.28 -3.15 -3.44 -3.79 -3.92 
DDiprivs -5.29 -5.29 -5.24 -7.98 -5.37 -7.54 -5.70 -7.13 -5.11 -5.30 -5.97 -5.12 -5.15 -5.74 -8.84 -7.19 
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Table 4.6.  F-statistic for testing the weak exogeneity of country-specific foreign variables 































Country F test 95% Critical Values Ys ipubs iprivs poil 
AT F(2,60) 3.15 0.16 1.35 0.30 0.50 
BE F(1,61) 4.00 0.51 7.22* 0.76 1.84 
DK F(2,60) 3.15 0.27 8.07* 0.00 1.56 
FI F(2,60) 3.15 2.75 0.49 3.88* 0.62 
FR F(2,60) 3.15 0.88 1.02 3.49* 0.64 
DE F(2,60) 3.15 1.55 3.10 0.18 0.37 
GR F(1,61) 4.00 2.00 10.33* 1.96 0.19 
IE F(3,59) 2.76 1.45 8.25* 0.64 2.46* 
IT F(1,61) 4.00 4.06* 0.82 1.75 0.56 
NL F(1,61) 4.00 1.80 1.39 0.40 3.83 
PT F(3,59) 2.76 1.74 2.92* 0.52 0.22 
ES F(2,60) 3.15 1.19 0.97 2.00 3.85* 
SE F(1,61) 4.00 0.24 0.20 0.57 0.46 
UK F(0,62)      
US F(3,59) 2.76 1.11 11.05* 0.81  
JP F(1,61) 4.00 1.32 10.57* 0.72 0.14 
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Table 4.7.  Contemporaneous effects of foreign variables on their country-specific counterparts 
 
Country Domestic Variables 
y Ipub ipriv 
AT 0.31 -0.53 0.78 
 [1.63] [-1.69] [2.89] 
 
BE 0.36 -0.23 0.07 
 [3.03] [-1.78] [0.46] 
 
DK 0.35 0.85 0.30 
 [1.35] [4.21] [0.86] 
 
FI 0.84 -0.04 -0.03 
 [3.03] [-0.33] [-0.10] 
 
FR 0.60 0.12 0.28 
 [7.57] [1.63] [3.19] 
 
DE 0.88 0.58 0.78 
 [3.90] [9.36] [3.46] 
 
GR 1.18 2.19 -1.61 
 [2.57] [7.41] [-1.849 
 
IE 1.98 0.40 -0.40 
 [3.06] [2.17] [-0.76] 
 
IT 0.98 0.10 -0.01 
 [6.84] [0.38] [-0.07] 
 
NL 1.03 1.10 0.48 
 [1.42] [9.13] [1.21] 
 
PT 0.18 -0.67 0.54 
 [0.46] [-1.32] [1.56] 
 
ES 0.11 0.64 0.74 
 [0.52] [2.45] [3.55] 
 
SE -0.15 0.16 1.48 
 [-0.49] [1.75] [4.18] 
 
UK 0.65 2.30 0.52 
 [2.29] [2.70] [1.18] 
 
US 0.06 0.22 0.63 
 [0.22] [5.28] [3.23] 
 
JP 0.26 0.01 0.16 
 [1.31] [0.53] [1.76] 
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This dissertation deepens the understanding about what role public intervention, through 
PPPs, public consumption, and public investment, can play to encourage economic activity 
and also to check which is the most efficient, from an economic point of view: public sector 
or private sector. In fact, in an economic environment such as the European Monetary Union 
(EMU), in which fiscal policy is the only instrument that governments have to offset 
idiosyncratic shocks, it is crucial to determine the capacity of the public sector to influence 
the economic activity of a country. The fact that the recovery of the euro area over the last 
decade has been slow, weak, and uneven invites us to question if countries that present a 
current account surplus, such as Germany, can contribute in a more explicit way to the 
recovery of the European economy.  
To investigate these questions we used three different econometric methodologies: a VAR, 
a panel VAR, and a GVAR. In chapter 2, a VAR model with four variables: public investment, 
private investment, PPP investment, and GDP was applied to test the macroeconomic 
impact of investment in public-private partnerships, and public and private investment in 
Portugal. Annual data from 1998 to 2013 were used only for the Portuguese economy. The 
results show us that investment in PPP leads to a crowding-out effect in both private and 
public investment and has a negative impact on GDP. In fact, the partial rate of return of an 
investment in PPP is negative, while the total rate of return associated with investment in 
PPP cannot be calculated since the accumulated gross growth rate over 20 years is 
negative. Public investment presents a crowding-in effect in private investment and in 
investment in PPP. In fact, in the presence of a positive shock in public investment, the 
impulse response functions show a positive initial impact in investment in both PPP and 
GDP. The output elasticity of public investment is positive. The partial rate of return of public 
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investment is greater than its total rate of return due to the fact that in the presence of a 
shock in public investment the response from the private investment and investment in PPP 
leads to an increase in output. Finally, private investment crowds-in both in investment in 
PPP and in public investment. The output elasticity of private investment is positive. The 
partial rate of return of private investment is higher than its total rate of return taking into 
account that the response of both public investment and investment in PPP to a shock in 
public investment is positive. The results that point to the existence of crowding-out in private 
and public investment as a consequence of investment in PPP, together with a negative 
partial rate of return of PPPs, are evidence that investment in PPP in Portugal, which 
involved almost exclusively the construction and operation of road infrastructures, is not the 
most efficient method of financing this kind of investment and/or have facilitated the 
expansion of road infrastructures beyond the social optimum. In fact, the investment through 
PPPs does not appear to be the kind of investment leading to the higher productivity that 
the Portuguese economy needs for a sustained increase in its export capacity or to allow for 
the correction of the accumulated external imbalances. Empirical results also support the 
belief that this kind of investment has undermined the capacity of private agents and the 
public sector to carry out their investment activities. 
In the third chapter we went beyond the behavior of the Portuguese economy, and focused 
our attention on the response of the average GDP to innovations on public consumption, 
public investment, and private investment in two groups of European countries: “peripheral 
countries” and “core countries”. The 14 countries under analysis were divided according to 
their ability to refinance their government debt or to bail out over-indebted banks on their 
own, as a result of the recent economic crisis. The first group was composed of Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; the second group was composed of Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. We 
also checked for crowding-out effects and crowding-in effects. Annual data were used 
instead of quarterly observations. The rationale for the use of annual data instead of 
quarterly data is the fact that there is no quarterly calendar for fiscal policy, and for that 
reason shocks identified with annual data may be closer to the actual shocks. The main 
drawback of annual data is the exclusion of within-year responses to shocks and also the 
fact that fewer observations are available. Due to this and in order to increase the precision 
of our estimates a panel VAR data was used. As mentioned above, the panel VAR approach 
allows for unobserved individual heterogeneity, adding a cross-sectional dimension to the 
model. The major disadvantage in using a panel VAR technique is that one cannot check 
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for the effects in each country on its own, but only an average effect on a certain group of 
countries.  
It was not possible to compare the results of a shock in public and private sector for the 
Portuguese economy. Based on the results from Impulse Response Functions and Variance 
Decomposition, we found evidence that in the case of the “peripheral countries”  the optimal 
measure to boost the economy is to raise public consumption or private investment, as in 
both cases GDP will tend to increase and one will find crowding-in effects. On the contrary, 
an innovation to public investment does not seem to be efficient, as GDP does not respond 
to it and one finds a crowding-out effect on private investment. As for the “core countries”, 
the most adequate way to improve economic growth seems to be an increase in private 
investment, as GDP does not respond at all to a shock to public consumption or to public 
investment.  
It is then clear from our analysis that countries do not react in the same way to shocks to 
public consumption, public investment, and private investment. In fact, public consumption 
plays an active role only in those economies that suffered severe economic consequences 
in the recent crisis. Private investment allows a push in the output of both the “peripheral 
countries” and the “core countries”. Portugal, the country analyzed in chapter 2, belongs to 
the “peripheral countries” group. In line with the results found in chapter 2, we find that in 
the “peripheral countries” group, on average, a crowding-in effect from a shock to private 
investment prevails. However, in chapter 2 a shock in Portuguese public investment crowds-
in PPP investment and private investment, while in the case of chapter 3, a shock to the 
public investment on the group of countries to which Portugal belongs seems, on average, 
to crowd-out private investment. Finally, if one takes into account all 14 countries in this 
analysis, the most efficient way to influence the economic performance of the group “all 
countries” is an increase in public consumption or in private investment, as GDP does not 
respond in a statistically significant way to a shock to public investment. 
Finally, in the fourth chapter, using a GVAR approach and in particular GIRFs, we investigate 
the existence of cross-country spillover effects of an innovation in public and private 
investment in 16 countries. In the context of the European Monetary Union, we sought to 
understand if a country that shows a current account surplus can help economies that 
present severe difficulties to recover from the recent crisis. Namely, we quantified the impact 
of these innovations in a central European economy (Germany) and in a peripheral one 
(Portugal) on the majority of the European countries, USA, and Japan. Quarterly data from 
87 
 
1997Q1 to 2014Q4 were used for the 16 countries. Foreign-specific variables were 
constructed using trade-based weights that were fixed over time and computed using the 
average of exports’ and imports’ cross-country data, for the period 1999-2014. The main 
advantage in using a GVAR instead of a VAR or a panel VAR is that it allows for a range of 
different interdependencies between variables and countries, such as theory consistent 
long-run relationships, short-run spillover effects, or cross-sectional dependence in the error 
structure, offering a fair degree of flexibility in modeling business-cycle dynamics of the world 
economy in a coherent fashion. In opposition to what happens in a VAR or a panel VAR, in 
which IRFs calculated using different orders of variables will cause a different shape of the 
IRFs, the use of GIRFs overcomes the problem related with the ordering of the variables 
used in the model. On the other hand, certain restrictions have to be imposed in a GVAR 
technology that are not present in a VAR or a panel VAR, namely the use of the trade-based 
weight matrix. Moreover, as a considerable number of countries and variables entered the 
GVAR, quarterly data had to be used instead of annual data, with the main drawbacks 
pointed out above.  
Our findings suggest a positive response in almost all countries’ GDP to a public investment 
shock in Germany. However, these increases do not achieve statistical significance, not 
even in Germany itself. Private investment reacts negatively and immediately after this 
shock in Austria and Belgium. In Germany one finds evidence of a crowding-in effect, as the 
reaction of private investment is positive. However, once more, it is not statistically 
significant, which is also the case for the remaining countries. After a shock to public 
investment in Germany, public investment increases in neighboring countries such as 
Austria, Netherlands, and Sweden. On the contrary, a stimulus in Germany’s public 
investment has a negative impact on Portuguese public investment, but only in the quarter 
immediately following the shock. Concerning a similar shock, but this time in a small open 
economy such as Portugal, GDP, as expected, does not react in a statistically significant 
way in any foreign country and also not in Portugal itself. Regarding private investment, it 
does respond positively and in a statistically significant way in Portugal only, pointing to a 
crowding-in effect in this economy, at least in the short run.  
This same crowding-in effect in the Portuguese private investment after an impulse in public 
investment was found in chapter 2. On the contrary, in chapter 3  the average private 
investment of the group of five economies to which Portugal belongs reacts negatively to a 
shock on public investment, pointing to a crowding-out effect. Public investment reacts in a 
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negative way in the first quarter immediately after the shock in Germany and Belgium, 
decreasing also in France in the first three quarters after the impulse. On the contrary, it 
shows a positive impact in Spanish and Portuguese public investment.  
Now looking at the results from an innovation in Germany’s private investment, GDP does 
not reacting in a statistically significant way. Germany’s private investment positive 
innovations do not seem to impinge significantly on other countries’ private investment, 
except in the case of neighboring economies, namely Netherlands and Sweden, and 
Germany itself. A one standard error impulse in Portuguese private investment does not 
seem to significantly stimulate GDP in any of the economies considered, as one might 
expect from a small open economy. This shock shows a positive impact in Portuguese public 
investment, pointing also to a crowding-in effect. This same crowding-in effect was found in 
the studies presented in both chapter 2 and chapter 3 of this dissertation. Overall, even if 
Germany increases its public investment, it will not have the desired positive impact on 
peripheral economies. In fact, we find statistically significant cross-border effects mainly in 
neighboring countries, with the magnitude of the impacts being modest.  
We perceive some natural extensions of the present dissertation. First, it would be fruitful to 
investigate the impacts of a decomposition of both private and public investment into the 
several categories that compose them instead of using them as a whole, as we did. It would 
also be of interest to analyze the impact on the investment’s profitability of the types of 
shocks studied in this dissertation, as well as the impacts on investment short-run demand 
side effect and the investment long-run supply side effects. Another natural extension of this 
work would be to question the impact of an investment shock not only on GDP, as we did, 
but also on the labor market, namely changes in the qualification of labor and also possible 
migrants’ movements due to an increase in investment in a certain country. It would be 
important to understand, in the European context, the extent to which a boost in the 
economic activity of center European economies can lead to a brain drain in the peripheral 
European countries. Another topic that may deserve further attention is the impact on the 
sustainability of public accounts as a result of an increase in public consumption or public 
investment. Finally, it would also be interesting to examine how an increase in public 
investment impacts the structure of the economy, i.e.,  what role can public investment have 
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